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Abstract 
This study draws on communication privacy management theory to explore aspects of social 
networking sites (SNSs) that may influence individual privacy management behaviors and 
conceptualizes two behaviors for managing privacy on SNSs: private disclosure (for managing 
information privacy) and territory coordination (for managing territory privacy). Evidence from two 
studies of SNS members indicates that perceptions of trespassing over agreed-upon virtual 
boundaries within SNSs affects risk beliefs regarding information privacy and territory privacy 
differently. These distinct privacy risk beliefs, in turn, influence two privacy management behaviors. 
Theoretically, this study demonstrates that a more complete conceptualization of individual privacy 
management on SNSs should consider both information privacy and territory privacy; and that 
territory coordination is a more significant indicator of privacy management behaviors on SNSs 
than private disclosure. From a practical standpoint, this study provides guidance to SNS platform 
organizations on how to reduce individuals’ privacy risk beliefs, encourage users to share private 
information, and potentially build larger online communities. 
Keywords: Social Networking Site, Privacy Management Behavior, Territory Privacy, Information 
Privacy, Online Privacy. 
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1 Introduction 
The massive amount of personal information that has 
become available online and stored in the cloud has put 
individual privacy at the forefront of the discussion on 
the ability to safely store that information. Social 
networking sites (SNSs) such as Facebook and Twitter 
are types of virtual communities “that allow 
individuals to…construct a public or semipublic 
profile within a bounded system” (Boyd & Ellison, 
2007, p. 211). SNSs are focused around sharing 
personal and/or private information (i.e., 
information about one’s thoughts, values, and 
experiences that the individual can reasonably 
expect will not be made public) for the purpose of 
social interaction and relationship development 
(Benson, Saridakis, & Tennakoon, 2015).  
Social profiling is the process of constructing a profile 
using an individual’s voluntarily shared social data, 
and most often refers to the process of generating a 
profile with the assistance of technology (Cirit, 
Nikravesh, & Alptekin, 2005). While social profiling 
has been used to track terrorists (Andrews, 2002) and 
serial killers (Cater, 1997), its most current application 




is employment-related. According to CareerBuilder’s 
annual recruitment survey for 2017, 70% of employers 
use social networking sites to research and screen 
potential job candidates, up from 52% in 2015, 22% in 
2008, and 11% in 2006 (Havenstein, 2008; Nauen, 
2017; Nikravan, 2016). Social profiling is being used 
to select job applicants, but it can also be used to 
exclude applicants or deny access to people with the 
“wrong” social profile (Basulto, 2012). This trend 
reenergizes questions of online privacy, particularly 
within the social networking context. 
There are over 275 million users on LinkedIn and 
Twitter, with approximately 2.2 billion users on 
Facebook. SNSs make their money from targeted 
advertising. Facebook made close to $8 billion in the 
first quarter of 2017 from digital advertisements. But, 
just ask the founders of MySpace—no users means no 
money. Thus, privacy within the context of SNSs 
should be a concern for individuals, employers and 
social networking service providers. To date, 
individual privacy management research on social 
networking sites has focused almost exclusively on the 
private information shared on these sites (e.g, Benson 
et al., 2015; Chakraborty, Vishik, & Rao, 2013; Chen, 
2013; Gerlach, Widjaja, & Buxmann, 2015; Kisekka, 
Bagchi-Sen, & Raghav Rao, 2013; Li, Lin, & Wang, 
2015; Shibchurn & Yan, 2015). 
But information is just part of the privacy story. In 
Altman’s (1975, p. 18) general theory of privacy, 
where privacy is defined as “the selective control of 
access to the self”, the concept of “the self” also 
includes personal spaces or territories. Territories are 
bounded physical areas that individuals perceive as 
their own (Altman, 1975; Brown, Lawrence, & 
Robinson, 2005; Brown & Robinson, 2011), and 
within which they may place objects and information. 
For example, within one’s home (a private physical 
territory) an individual may place objects such as 
furniture, bills, computers, and so on. These objects 
have information associated with them, and the 
associated information may be personal and/or private 
to the individual. For example, the rug (object) in one’s 
dining room (territory) may be Persian and a treasured 
gift from late Aunt Mary (personal information). Thus, 
the notion of territory conveys the idea of ownership 
of a space, including the objects and information 
within that space. While the individual may invite 
others into the territory, trespassing into that space is 
not acceptable. In the physical world, trespassing can 
include something as innocuous as cutting through a 
neighbor’s backyard, to hunting on private land, to 
breaking into an individual’s home with malicious 
intent. In each of these scenarios, one’s private space 
(e.g., territory) is being intruded upon.  
So, what about an individual’s private space on the 
Internet? Dinev et al. (2006, p. 393) relate private 
space and public space to perceptions of privacy, 
where privacy protection is strongly synonymous with 
the creation of a privacy zone. Within the context of 
Facebook, such a zone is established with the 
management of privacy settings. This enables users to 
determine who should have access to their profiles, and 
to define the level of access their network members 
have to their profiles. Having access to a profile on 
Facebook implies that a network member is able “to 
view and comment on any information posted on the 
profile and to tag the profile owner in contents (e.g. 
photos, videos, messages) shared by a network 
member” (Beldad, 2016, p. 22). 
A place can be thought of as a container within which 
individuals have experiences and express themselves 
(Halford & Leonard, 2006) and “is formed by what 
people do within the boundaries of this container and 
by how they interact with others in it” (Saunders, 
Rutkowski, van Genuchten, Vogel, & Orrego, 2011, p. 
1081). Related to this is the idea of a “third place”. 
Oldenburg (1989) originally defined a third place as a 
physical location beyond home and work where people 
informally gather to socialize with each other (e.g., 
coffee shop). Researchers are beginning to explore 
online third places (Peachey, 2010; Soukup, 2006), and 
specifically third places within an online gaming 
context (e.g., Ducheneaut, Moore, & Nickell, 2007; 
Rao, 2008; Steinkuehler & Williams, 2006), an online 
music sharing context (Mechant & Evens, 2011), and 
an online academic learning environment 
(Aldosemani, Shepherd, Gashim, & Dousay, 2016).  
An individual becomes attached to a specific place 
because “she has had activities that are meaningful 
within its boundaries” (Goel, Johnson, Junglas, & Ives, 
2011, p. 751). Thus, an individual may have fond 
childhood memories of family vacations and become 
attached to a physical place (e.g., cabin in the 
mountains), or become attached to the virtual place where 
she announced her first pregnancy to her family (e.g., 
Facebook). On the Internet, a virtual place is a “bounded 
space imbued with meaning” (Saunders et al., 2011, p. 
1080), and in essence, an SNS is a publicly accessible 
virtual place (Bateman, Pike, & Butler, 2011). 
Within the framework of online places, in addition to 
public places, SNSs allow individuals to create 
semipublic places (i.e., third places) (Boyd & Ellison, 
2007). Most SNSs allow individuals to set boundaries 
around their online places so they can interact 
differently with different groups of people and a few 
researchers have begun to explore SNS privacy 
settings (e.g., Beldad, 2016; Heirman, Walrave, 
Vermeulen, Ponnet, Vandebosch, Van Ouytsel, & Van 
Gool, 2016; Lankton, McKnight, & Tripp, 2017; 
Spottswood & Hancock, 2017). Drawing on Brown et 
al.’s (2005) theory of territory (also in Altman, 1975 
and Brown & Robinson, 2011), we build on the idea of 
a third place and refer to these bounded online places 
as virtual territories. More precisely, a private virtual 




territory on an SNS is a bounded location within 
cyberspace that an individual perceives as his/her own, 
where the individual can store and/or display objects 
and information, but also where the individual may 
control the level of access given to and interaction 
allowed with specific groups and/or subgroups of 
others. Examples of virtual territories on social 
networking sites include an individual’s online photo 
album on Instagram, timeline (wall) on Facebook, or 
home on Twitter to name a few. For example, while an 
individual may feel comfortable announcing her first 
pregnancy to her family on Facebook by posting the 
ultrasound picture, she might not want some SNS 
members (e.g., her coworkers) to see the image. She 
also might not want some other SNS members to be 
able to leave comments. In this case, she controls the 
level of access to and interaction within her private 
virtual territory by establishing a boundary regarding 
who can and cannot access the image, comment on it, 
and/or link (tag) other members to it. 
After the San Bernardino, California terrorist attack of 
2015, Hilary Clinton made the following statement 
referencing virtual territories, “Resolve means 
depriving jihadists of virtual territory, just as we work 
to deprive them of actual territory.… They [the 
terrorists] are using websites, social media, chat rooms 
and other platforms to celebrate beheadings, recruit 
future terrorists and call for attacks” (qtd., Perlroth & 
Issac, 2015, emphasis added). Previous research has 
also hinted at the existence of a virtual territory as 
regards to privacy on the Internet. For example, within 
an e-commerce context, Hong and Thong (2013) assert 
that information privacy concerns contain two factors 
that they label interaction management and 
information management, thus broaching the 
territory/information distinction. 
We assert that not only can individuals place 
information in a private virtual territory, they can also 
manage the privacy of that virtual territory. To manage 
virtual territory privacy, individuals control the level 
of access to and interaction within the territory (i.e., 
allowing/disallowing someone to see a post, to 
comment on the post, and/or to allow others to see or 
comment on the post). “Contrary to popular belief, 
privacy does not necessarily mean withdrawing from 
people. Instead, it involves controlling the amount and 
type of contact one has with others” (Pedersen, 1999, 
p. 397). When participating on a social networking site 
one is choosing to interact with others, while still 
maintaining control over one’s territory and 
information within the SNS. 
Previous studies have characterized privacy as 
comprising multiple dimensions (e.g., Burgoon, 
Parrott, Poire, Kelley, Walther, & Perry, 1989; Westin, 
2003). Ball, Daniel, and Stride (2012) identified three 
distinct dimensions of workplace privacy and labeled 
them: personal information privacy, working 
environment privacy, and solitude privacy. Westin 
(1967) identified four dimensions (solitude, intimacy, 
anonymity, and reserve) in which the reserve can be 
equated to Westin’s concept of privacy where one can 
control, or reserve, information as desired. While 
several dimensions of privacy have been proposed 
in the literature, a common thread is that they 
involve opening and/or closing boundaries in an 
attempt to optimize access by others or achieving the 
desired level of contact between the self and others 
in a given circumstance. For example, Taylor and 
Ferguson (1980, p. 237) found “a sturdy linkage 
between privacy and territoriality”. 
By inviting someone to access and interact with a 
Facebook post, individuals share with online social 
network members not only their private information, 
such as feelings, life stories, and objects (e.g., photos), 
but also their private virtual territory. Control-related 
issues have been identified as the top three predictors 
of Facebook usage intensity (Jordaan & Van Heerden, 
2017). The recent high-profile privacy issues with 
Facebook have again highlighted concerns regarding 
personal information and control. A national online 
poll, conducted by Reuters less than one month after 
the Cambridge Analytica scandal indicated that only 
23 percent of Facebook users believe they have 
“total control” over their information on the 
platform (Kahn & Ingram, 2018). 
If individuals want high territory privacy, they could 
tightly control the level of access to and interaction 
within their virtual territory by making their specific 
Facebook “posts” accessible only to close friends, 
disabling comments, and disallowing invitations of 
other friends (tagging). But if individuals want low 
territory privacy, then they could more loosely control 
the level of access to and interaction within their 
territory by making some Facebook “posts” public, 
enabling comments, and allowing invitations 
(tagging). Therefore, to manage privacy on SNSs, 
individuals determine not only what information they 
want revealed (information privacy), but also control 
the level of access to and interaction within their 
private virtual territories (territory privacy). Stated 
another way, within the context of an SNS, 
information privacy considers the revelation of an 
individual’s private information, and territory 
privacy considers the level of access to and 
interaction within an individual’s private space.  
Previous literature on online privacy has assumed all 
components of an online community contribute 
equally to participants’ evaluation of their risk 
exposure (e.g., Chen, Lu, Guo, & Lin, 2013; Debatin, 
Lovejoy, Horn, & Hughes, 2009; Dinev & Hart, 2006) 
and privacy management behavior (e.g., Benson et al., 
2015; Chen, 2013; Cheung, Lee, & Chan, 2015; Li et 
al., 2015). Because individuals may have differing 
views of their privacy risks, we argue that research 




should consider both information and territory when 
considering individual privacy on SNSs. Thus, privacy 
management behavior should not be restricted to the 
behavior that determines the revelation of private 
information (i.e., private disclosure; Derlega, Metts, 
Petronio, & Margulis, 1993; Posey, Lowry, Roberts, & 
Ellis, 2010), but should also embrace individual 
behavior in order to regulate the level of access to and 
interaction within a private virtual territory (i.e., 
territory coordination; Petronio, 2002). Thus, we 
explore the following research question: 
RQ: What factors influence how individuals manage 
their information privacy and territory privacy on 
SNSs?  
This research makes two main theoretical 
contributions. First, this study introduces the construct 
of territory privacy and empirically examines it within 
the context of SNSs. We contribute to the literature by 
the discovery that information privacy and territory 
privacy are two essential and distinct components of an 
individual’s perception of online privacy on an SNS. 
Second, although prior literature has hinted at 
individual behaviors to manage virtual territories (e.g., 
Child, Pearson, & Petronio, 2009; Jiang, Heng, & 
Choi, 2013), these behaviors have not been 
systematically conceptualized and studied. This study 
draws on internet privacy theory (Malhotra, Kim, & 
Agarwal, 2004) and communication privacy 
management theory (Petronio, 1991, 2002) to explore 
how individuals make decisions about managing 
privacy on SNSs, and examines two behaviors for 
managing privacy: private disclosure (managing the 
revelation of private information) and territory 
coordination (controlling the level of access to and 
interaction within virtual territories). 
2 Background 
2.1 Privacy in an Offline Context 
We define personal information as information that 
can be used to identify a person (Culnan & Armstrong, 
1999), while private information refers to the personal 
information that an individual may not make public, 
such as a childhood nickname or birthdate (Petronio, 
2002). There is no absolute differentiation between 
what information is public, personal, or private, as 
individuals may perceive different degrees of 
sensitivity regarding the same information. Consistent 
with previous research on information privacy (e.g., 
Fernandez, 2008) and our research objective, we 
define information privacy as the freedom of an 
individual to determine the extent to which private 
information is communicated to others (Westin, 2003).  
In the general privacy literature, privacy is concerned 
with how individuals regulate access to themselves 
(Margulis, 2003; Smith, Dinev, & Xu, 2011) and 
includes the regulation of boundaries to control access 
to the self. The bounded areas that individuals perceive 
as their own are defined as territories, and territoriality 
is “an individual’s behavioral expression of feelings of 
ownership toward a physical or social object” (Brown 
et al., 2005, p. 578). In the offline context, the concept 
of territory privacy has been used to understand 
privacy concerns (see Brown, 2009; Fernandez, 
2008; Ji & Lieber, 2010; Kimmons & Austin, 2012) 
and the resulting behaviors (design of rural 
settlements: Al-Nowaiser, 1987; protecting a home: 
Fernandez, 2008; introduction of wind turbines: 
Pedersen, Hallberg, & Waye, 2007).  
To achieve the desired level of privacy, individuals 
regulate the level of access to their territory by 
regulating the territory’s boundaries (Altman, 1975); 
for example, by erecting walls or fences, closing doors 
or windows, making signs, or arranging objects within 
the territory. Based on the work of Altman, individuals 
can regulate inputs from others in the form of 
interaction and outputs to others in the form of 
information. For example, a closed office door with a 
sign stating “Come in” indicates a different level of 
privacy than a sign stating “Do not disturb”. If the 
individual locks the door, this may indicate that yet a 
different level of privacy is required. Further, a desk in 
the middle of a professor’s office may imply a 
separation of a private-work zone for the professor and 
a semipublic zone for visitors. If an individual ignores 
the “Do not disturb” sign and walks into the unlocked 
office, or a visitor walks directly into the professor’s 
private-work zone, most likely some discomfort or 
tension will arise between the two individuals as the 
visitor has trespassed into the individual’s territory. 
Altman’s privacy theory contends that controlling 
access to the self includes not only controlling what 
information about the self is communicated to others 
(information privacy), but also controlling the level of 
access to and interactions with the self (territory 
privacy). Each of these types of privacy are detailed 
within the SNS context.  
2.2 Privacy in an SNS Context 
In the SNS context, studies have identified several 
motives for disclosing information, such as the 
individuals’ attitude toward the SNS (Chen & 
Sharma, 2015); concerns about social influence, 
reciprocity, and trust (Posey et al., 2010), and to the 
desire to “show off” to others (Waters & Ackerman, 
2011). Bateman et al. (2011) found that the perceived 
publicness of an SNS negatively influenced 
individuals’ self-disclosure intentions. 
Recall that an SNS allows an individual to create a 
public or semipublic space within a bounded system to 
place information into and to interact with others to 
develop social relationships (Boyd & Ellison, 2007). 
On SNSs, territories are social constructions that come 




into being through the territorial behavior of 
individuals (Brown et al., 2005). A private virtual 
territory within an SNS context is a location in 
cyberspace where an individual can store and/or 
display objects and information, but also where the 
individual interacts with others for social purposes. We 
create meaning through interactions with others, and in 
doing so, socially construct our reality (Saunders et al., 
2011). As Brown et al. (2005, p. 579) state, “As with 
all social constructions, an object only exists as a 
territory to the extent that it is reproduced in social 
interaction among relevant actors”. Like in the 
physical world, individuals regulate access to their 
private virtual territory by regulating the boundaries of 
that territory. For example, on Facebook members of 
an individual’s social network may (or may not) be 
able to view posts on an individual’s “timeline”, 
respond to (comment on) a post, “like” a post made 
by the individual, and/or invite (tag) others to see 
the post. Thus, social network members may (or may 
not) have access to the private virtual territory and 
may or may not be allowed to interact within the 
private virtual territory, depending on the level of 
privacy the individual desires. 
Altman’s privacy theory contends that privacy is an 
input process and an output process, as “people and 
groups attempt to regulate contacts from others and 
output they make to others” (Altman, 1975, p. 11). For 
the input process, people regulate privacy regarding 
what comes in from others; for the output process, 
people regulate privacy in terms of what goes out from 
the self. On SNSs, individuals manage the input 
process by regulating the level of access to and 
interaction within their private virtual territories 
(territory privacy), and individuals manage the output 
process by regulating the revelation of private 
information (information privacy). Following these 
discussions, we assert that it is appropriate (and 
needed) for research on individual privacy on SNSs to 
investigate territory privacy, in addition to information 
privacy. We assert that individual privacy on social 
networking sites is the freedom of an individual on a 
social networking site to determine to what extent and 
to whom (a) one’s private information is revealed, and 
(b) one’s private virtual territory is accessible.  
2.3 Model and Hypotheses 
The main purpose of the research model is to 
investigate, within the SNS context, how an individual 
manages information privacy and territory privacy. A 
portion of the research model—i.e., the nomological 
network of information privacy concerns, information 
                                                          
1 Assuming information privacy as the focus within an e-
commerce context is appropriate because the e-commerce 
environment only allows an individual to decide what 
information to share with an organization. Once the 
trusting beliefs, and information privacy risk beliefs—
has been examined in the e-commerce context by 
Malhotra et al. (2004). Our research builds on and 
extends previous work by using a communication 
privacy management lens, incorporating the concept of 
territory privacy management, and situating the model 
within an SNS context.   
Communication privacy management (CPM) theory 
(Petronio, 1991, 2002) was originally developed to 
explain how an individual reveals or conceals private 
information to confidant(s). CPM theory uses the 
analogy of a boundary to explain individuals’ privacy 
management behaviors. Boundary synchronicity/ 
harmony occurs when individuals and their confidants 
understand and comply with mutually agreed-upon 
privacy practices. Boundary turbulence occurs when 
an individual is concerned about information leakage 
through the boundary. The main contention of CPM 
theory is that when boundary synchronicity is 
disrupted (i.e., boundary turbulence occurs), 
individuals and their confidants exert privacy 
management behavior to regain boundary synchronicity. 
Within the information systems (IS) literature CPM 
theory has been used to study information privacy 
management in a variety of contexts—such as 
electronic commerce 1  (e.g., Metzger, 2007), health 
information disclosures (e.g., Anderson & Agarwal, 
2011), employee monitoring (e.g., Chang, Liu, & Lin, 
2015), blogging (e.g., Child & Agyeman-Budu, 2010), 
individual privacy management strategies (e.g., 
Lankton et al., 2017), individual versus group privacy 
management practices (e.g., De Wolf, Willaert, & 
Pierson, 2014), and social networking (e.g., Bateman 
et al., 2011; Chen & Sharma, 2015; Posey et al., 2010; 
Waters & Ackerman, 2011).  
Although CPM theory focuses on explaining the 
management of one’s information-related privacy, the 
idea that privacy involves control over boundaries is 
highlighted here in the exploration of territory privacy. 
A collective virtual territory (CVT) is the area in an 
individual’s private virtual territory into which the 
individual invites confidant(s) (i.e., social network 
members), thus establishing a confidant group. An 
individual establishes a CVT boundary by determining 
who is allowed to access a CVT, how they can access 
the CVT, and how they can interact in the CVT. When 
a collective virtual territory is established, the 
individual and his/her confidants are co-owners. For 
example, according to Child et al. (2009), establishing 
a Facebook page creates a CVT in which a specific 
community (i.e., confidant group) is given access to 
the territory. An individual may manage multiple 
information is disclosed, the individual rarely has further 
control over the information. 




CVTs on a social networking site such as a photo 
album (CVT1) and a message board (CVT2). See 
Figure 1 for a graphical representation of the territories 
under discussion. Each of the collective virtual 
territories (CVT1, CVT2, CVT3, and CVT4) denotes a 
different area within an individual’s private virtual 
territory on a social networking platform.  
Based on Malhotra et al.’s (2004) theory of internet 
privacy, the research model presented next is 
comprised of three primary components: privacy 
management, context-specific factors, and personal 
dispositions. The components of the model are detailed 
next working from right to left in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 1. Virtual Territory 
 
 
Figure 2. Research Model 




In the research model (Figure 2), the first component, 
privacy management, is behavior that determines the 
level of revelation of private information and the 
regulation of the level of access to and interaction 
within a private virtual territory. Private disclosure 
occurs when individuals voluntarily and intentionally 
reveal information about themselves to others (Derlega 
et al., 1993; Petronio, 2002; Posey et al., 2010). 
Through private disclosure, an individual determines 
what private information is shared and what is 
concealed. Territory coordination occurs when 
individuals manage their private virtual territory. 
Through territory coordination, individuals determine 
who can and cannot access their various private virtual 
territories, and also how confidants can interact within 
their virtual territory. Individuals regulate the level of 
access to their private virtual territory by regulating the 
boundaries around their private virtual territory in 
various forms, including differentiating between 
people (e.g., who can have access), areas (e.g., which 
areas are accessible), and interactions (e.g., level of 
access). For example, some SNSs have tools (i.e., 
privacy settings) for determining who can see an 
individual’s specific posts or personal information. 
Other SNS tools allow individuals to manage whether 
a post can be tagged (i.e., allow friends to invite others 
to see/respond to the post) and to review a tag before it 
appears. Yet other SNS tools allow individuals to 
manage who may connect to the individual, who may 
message the individual, who may post, and who may 
send app/event invites. In essence, to manage privacy 
on SNSs, an individual determines what private 
information is to be revealed (i.e., private 
disclosure; Derlega et al., 1993; Petronio, 2002; 
Posey et al., 2010), and who the individual wants to 
grant access to and interact with in the private virtual 
territory (i.e., territory coordination). 
The second component in the research model—
context-specific factors—represents a trust-risk 
appraisal that helps explain individuals’ privacy 
management behavior. In their theory of internet 
privacy, Malhotra et al. (2004) included trusting beliefs 
and risk beliefs to explain an individual’s revelation of 
private information in the e-commerce context. On 
SNSs, there is a level of perceived uncertainty related 
to privacy and participation in online social networks 
(the element of risk) and a level of one’s willingness to 
be vulnerable (the element of trust). These factors can 
influence both types of privacy management behavior. 
Trust is the confidence that individuals will act as 
expected, and without that confidence, individuals 
might more stringently manage their privacy on SNSs 
(i.e., manage the risk). For example, Child, Petronio, 
Agyeman-Budu, & Westermann (2011) found that 
because of anticipated risks (i.e., information privacy 
risk beliefs), bloggers often regret disclosing certain 
information and sometimes remove posted information 
(i.e., private disclosure). Similarly, because of 
anticipated risks (i.e., territory privacy risk beliefs), an 
individual might remove someone from their “close 
friends” confidant group in their SNSs (i.e., territory 
coordination). In this research we assert that the higher 
the perceived vulnerability and privacy risk on a 
specific SNS, the higher the likelihood individuals will 
increase their privacy management behavior. 
The third component in the research model is personal 
dispositions. Personal dispositions can be thought of as 
general tendencies or enduring characteristics of 
individuals (Ormerod, McKenzie, & Woods, 1995) 
that can influence a variety of outcomes. An 
individual’s perception of a situation can be influenced 
by personal characteristics and past experiences 
(Hornsey, 2008). Malhotra et al. (2004) contend that 
personal dispositions (i.e., information privacy 
concerns) influence information trusting beliefs and 
information risk beliefs. In our research, information 
and territory privacy concerns capture individuals’ 
anxiety, feelings, and/or disposition toward SNS 
privacy practices in general and are not specific to one 
SNS. While people may have different ideas about 
what is fair or appropriate concerning privacy 
practices, an individual’s general tendency regarding 
concerns about privacy (i.e., information and territory 
privacy concerns) influences the individual’s trust 
beliefs and risk beliefs in a specific SNS context. 
We now turn to detailing the constructs and 
relationships between the constructs. We begin by 
developing the hypotheses for the distal antecedents, 
and then the proximal antecedents of privacy 
management behavior (moving from left to right in the 
model in Figure 2). 
2.3.1 Privacy Concerns and Trusting Beliefs 
Information privacy concerns refers to individuals’ 
concerns about the information privacy practices of 
their SNS members. Information trusting beliefs is the 
degree to which an individual believes SNS confidant 
group members will behave in a dependable manner 
regarding his or her private information (Malhotra et 
al., 2004). Research on trust has suggested that one’s 
perception of trust depends on perceptions of how 
others will behave (Good, 1988), or the trustworthiness 
of others (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). 
Research has also found that an individual with high 
information privacy concerns is less likely to trust 
others’ information privacy practices in both an e-
commerce context (Eastlick, Lotz, & Warrington, 
2006; Fortes & Paulo, 2016; Malhotra et al., 2004; Van 
Slyke, Shim, Johnson, & Jiang, 2006), and an SNS 
context (Chang, Liu, & Shen, 2017). When an 
individual has the tendency to worry about information 
being leaked, the individual may perceive others as less 
trustworthy or honest regarding his or her private 
information in the specific SNS context (low 
information trusting beliefs). We confirm the 




relationship in the SNS context so that we can compare 
the relationship with that of the territory privacy 
concerns / territory trusting beliefs relationship.  
H1: On a social networking site, individuals’ 
information privacy concerns will negatively 
influence their information trusting beliefs. 
Territory privacy concerns refers to an individual’s 
worries about SNS members’ territory privacy 
practices. Territory trusting beliefs is the degree to 
which an individual believes his/her SNS confidant 
group members will behave in a dependable manner 
regarding his or her private virtual territory (i.e., 
confidants will not violate the individual’s 
expectations regarding the virtual territory). An 
individual with high territory privacy concerns may 
anticipate that SNS confidant group members will 
share the private virtual territory with undependable 
others or act inappropriately in the private virtual 
territory. Therefore, the individual may be more 
suspicious and less trusting of SNS confidant group 
members. For example, Mary has concerns about 
controlling access to her private virtual territory 
because she does not know how to use the 
configuration tools to configure the visibility of her 
private virtual territory as she would like to. Because 
she cannot adequately control her territory, she 
strongly feels that her confidants also cannot be 
depended on to control the territory as she would like 
(i.e., they will make her private virtual territory public 
without her knowledge or permission). Thus, the 
degree to which an individual is concerned about the 
vulnerability of the territory (territory privacy 
concerns) influences the perception of confidant 
trustworthiness regarding the virtual territory 
(territory trusting beliefs).  
H2: On a social networking site, individuals’ territory 
privacy concerns will negatively influence their 
territory trusting beliefs. 
2.3.2 Privacy Concerns and Privacy Risk 
Beliefs 
Information privacy risk beliefs refers to an 
individual’s perception of the likelihood of loss due to 
sharing private information with SNS confidant group 
members. Research has established a positive 
relationship between information privacy concerns and 
information privacy risk beliefs in an e-commerce 
context (Fortes & Paulo, 2016; Hong & Thong, 2013; 
Malhotra et al., 2004; Van Slyke et al., 2006) and an 
SNS context (Fogel & Nehmad, 2009; Liang, Liu, Lu, 
& Wong, 2015). On an SNS, when an individual has 
the tendency to worry about information being 
leaked, the individual may perceive greater risk of 
potential loss. We confirm this relationship in our 
context so that we can compare the information 
privacy concerns / information privacy risk beliefs 
relationship with the territory privacy concerns / 
territory privacy risk beliefs relationship.  
H3: On a social networking site, individuals’ 
information privacy concerns will positively 
influence their information privacy risk beliefs. 
Theoretical frameworks of risk behavior have 
suggested that the tendency to worry about negative 
consequences may make an individual weigh the 
negative outcomes as more significant and thus 
possibly overestimate the probability of loss 
(Schneider & Lopes, 1986; Sitkin & Pablo, 1992). 
According to James et al. (2015), privacy concerns in 
online social networks include the desire to control 
information and interaction, leading to the “dual 
privacy decision” in which individuals choose what 
information to release and also who may have access 
to and interact within the virtual territory. Individuals 
with higher territory privacy concerns may worry 
about the negative consequences resulting from 
allowing access and interaction privileges within their 
private virtual territories.  
From a CPM theory perspective, when individuals 
have territory privacy concerns, they worry about 
collective privacy practices, the vulnerabilities of their 
private virtual territory, and how confidant group 
members on their SNS will treat the collective virtual 
territory. For example, John may feel concerned about 
the fact that he does not know how to (or cannot) 
prohibit his college friends from tagging (i.e., inviting) 
others into his private virtual territory (high territory 
privacy concerns). This concern may further increase 
John’s perception of potential loss of territory privacy 
(i.e., territory privacy risk beliefs).  
Territory privacy risk beliefs refers to an individual’s 
perception of the likelihood of loss from allowing SNS 
confidant group members to access and interact in 
one’s private virtual territory. When individuals 
perceive ambiguity or have concerns about virtual 
territory privacy management practices, the 
individuals may believe that their private virtual 
territory is more vulnerable or at risk. For example, 
John has no idea of the consequences of a confidant 
allowing access to unknown others (allows tagging) 
and how the unknown others will behave in the virtual 
territory. Will the unknown others respect the virtual 
territory and act appropriately or will they be 
disrespectful (e.g., break the agreed-upon privacy 
management practice and further share access to the 
virtual territory)? Because John is worried about the 
practice of tagging (high territory privacy concerns), 
he may believe that his private virtual territory that is 
currently shared with his college friends will be 
unexpectedly trespassed into by some unknown other 
(high territory privacy risk beliefs). Thus, the higher 
the level of concern regarding the vulnerability of a 




virtual territory, the higher the perceived probability of 
loss of territory privacy. 
H4: On a social networking site, individuals’ territory 
privacy concerns will positively influence their 
territory privacy risk beliefs. 
2.3.3 Trusting Beliefs and Privacy Risk 
Beliefs 
An individual with high information trusting beliefs 
accepts that SNS confidant group members are 
trustworthy and would not share private information 
with others. Research has found that within an e-
commerce context an individual with high information 
trusting beliefs is less likely to expect a loss due to 
sharing private information (Jarvenpaa, Tractinsky, & 
Saarinen, 1999; Malhotra et al., 2004). The higher 
an individual’s information trusting beliefs, the 
lower the individual’s perceived information 
privacy risk. We confirm this negative relationship 
in the SNS context so that we can compare the 
relationship with the territory trusting beliefs / 
territory privacy risk beliefs relationship.  
H5: On a social networking site, individuals’ 
information trusting beliefs will negatively 
influence their information privacy risk beliefs. 
As the individual and confidant group are co-owners of 
the virtual territory, they have established the privacy 
practices for this territory (i.e., drawn the boundary 
around the territory). According to CPM theory, when 
boundary synchronicity is expected, the individual 
trusts that a confidant will not deliberately or 
inadvertently allow access to the collectively held 
virtual territory to unauthorized others. An individual 
with high territory trusting beliefs generally believes 
that SNS confidant group members are dependable and 
trustworthy with respect to access to and interaction 
within the individual’s private virtual territory. For 
example, John (virtual territory owner) believes 
Zack (a confidant) will not give access to John’s 
online album to his spouse, because John and Zack 
have agreed that the album (i.e., private virtual 
territory) should never be shared. John trusts that 
Zack will not violate their agreement, so he believes 
the album is secure. 
Theoretical frameworks of trust behavior have 
suggested that the tendency to trust others involves the 
trustor’s willingness to become vulnerable (Moorman, 
Zaltman, & Deshpande, 1992). The willingness to 
increase one’s vulnerability can be interpreted as one’s 
propensity to take risks (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992). An 
individual with a high risk-taking propensity will 
weigh positive outcomes as more significant and will 
tend to underestimate the probability of loss (i.e., 
perceive lower risks) (Brockhaus, 1980; Sitkin & 
Pablo, 1992; Vlek & Stallen, 1980). Also, high trusting 
beliefs reduces the individual’s perception of the 
likelihood of others engaging in opportunistic behavior 
(Jarvenpaa, Tractinsky, & Vitale, 2000; Mayer et al., 
1995). Therefore, we argue that individuals who 
believe that SNS confidant group members will treat 
their private virtual territory in a trustworthy manner 
(e.g., not allow access to unknown or unauthorized 
others) are more likely to perceive lower privacy 
risks regarding their private virtual territory. Stated 
another way, the higher an individual’s territory 
trusting beliefs, the lower the individual’s 
perceived territory privacy risk.  
H6: On a social networking site, individuals’ territory 
trusting beliefs will negatively influence their 
territory privacy risk beliefs. 
2.3.4 Territory Privacy Risk Beliefs and 
Information Privacy Risk Beliefs 
On SNSs, individuals place private information and 
objects into their private virtual territory (e.g., upload 
pictures to their Facebook wall, posts about their New 
Year’s resolution). When an agreement with a 
confidant about how to manage a private virtual 
territory is violated, the individual may feel that 
ownership of the territory, as well as the objects 
(uploaded picture) therein are at risk. Much like in the 
physical world, if your home is at risk of invasion, then 
the contents of your home are also at risk. In their study 
of Facebook, van Schaik, Jansen, Onibokun, Camp, & 
Kusev (2018) found that over 50% of the participants 
reported having taken precautions against potential 
violations of privacy through social network privacy 
settings. Therefore, we assert that the perceived level 
of security of the private virtual territory influences the 
perceived level security of the private information that 
resides within the territory. If individuals believe their 
territory is at risk, then they will likely perceive that the 
information housed within the territory is also at risk. 
H7: On a social networking site, individuals’ territory 
privacy risk beliefs will positively influence their 
information privacy risk beliefs. 
2.3.5 Trusting Beliefs and Privacy 
Management Behavior 
Recall that privacy management is the behavior 
engaged in by individuals to manage their information 
and territory on SNSs, and that private disclosure and 
territory coordination are two types of privacy 
management behaviors. Private disclosure refers to 
individuals’ voluntary and intentional behavior of 
revealing private information to his/her SNS confidant 
group members (Derlega et al., 1993; Petronio, 2002; 
Posey et al., 2010), and territory coordination refers to 
individuals’ voluntary and intentional behavior to 
manage the level of access to and interaction within 
their virtual territories. 




Research has found that an individual with high 
information trusting beliefs is more likely to disclose 
private information in an e-commerce context 
(Malhotra et al., 2004; Van Slyke et al., 2006). 
Interestingly, in an SNS context Lo (2010) found a 
positive relationship between trust of the SNS and 
information disclosure, whereas McKnight, Lankton, 
and Tripp (2011) found a negative relationship 
between trust of the SNS and information disclosure. 
As the purpose of an SNS is to build social 
relationships, in this research, we view trust from the 
perspective that SNS members trust confidant group 
members not to misuse the information that has been 
shared. We therefore propose that individuals with 
higher trust in their SNS confidant group members will 
be willing to disclose more private information.  
H8: On a social networking site, individuals’ 
information trusting beliefs will positively 
influence their disclosure of private information. 
Based on the theory of territoriality, Brown, Crossley, 
and Robinson (2014) found that a high trust work 
environment reduced the territorial behavior of 
individuals. As stated previously, an individual with 
high territory trusting beliefs believes SNS confidant 
group members will behave in a dependable manner 
regarding the individual’s private virtual territory. 
Thus, the individual may reduce his/her territorial 
behavior. For example, if Selena trusts her SNS 
confidant group members in terms of how they will 
access and interact within her virtual territory, she 
might not feel the need to prevent them from tagging 
others. Also, from a CPM theory perspective, an 
individual with high territory trusting beliefs expects 
boundary synchronicity, and the individual, therefore, 
will not exert territory coordination behavior to 
change the current status. We therefore propose, 
similarly, that an individual with higher trust in SNS 
confidant group members regarding how they will 
access and behave in his or her private virtual 
territory will be less inclined to express territorial 
behaviors, such as highly coordinating the boundary 
of that territory (lower territory coordination).  
H9: On a social networking site, individuals’ territory 
trusting beliefs will negatively influence their 
territory coordination.  
2.3.6 Privacy Risk Beliefs and Privacy 
Management Behavior  
Research has found that an individual who perceives 
a high likelihood of loss due to sharing private 
information (i.e., high information privacy risk 
beliefs) is less likely to disclose private information 
in an e-commerce setting (Malhotra et al., 2004). 
Within an SNS setting this relationship has been 
supported (Hajli & Lin, 2016; Posey et al., 2010) and 
not supported (Cheung et al., 2015). We test this 
relationship in the SNS context so that we can 
compare the relationship with the territory privacy 
risk beliefs—territory coordination relationship. 
H10: On a social networking site, individuals’ 
perceived information privacy risk beliefs will 
negatively influence their disclosure of private 
information.  
Research has found that individuals who perceive risks 
to their information are strongly disposed to engage in 
privacy management behaviors (Park, Campbell, & 
Kwak, 2012). In addition to the behavior of disclosing 
(or not disclosing) private information, an individual’s 
privacy management behavior on an SNS includes 
managing the private virtual territory that contains the 
information. Recall that territory coordination involves 
individual behavior to regulate the level of access to 
and interaction within a private virtual territory. By 
engaging in territory coordination individuals protect 
their private virtual territory from infringement by 
others (Brown et al., 2005). Therefore, on SNSs, 
individuals engage in territory coordination behavior 
to prevent their private virtual territory from unwanted 
intrusion. If individuals perceive that the information 
has a high potential for loss, they might increase the 
protection of the information by building a stronger 
boundary around the private virtual territory. For 
example, in an offline context if an individual decides 
to keep valuable financial records at home, he or she 
might consider installing a security system to increase 
the protection of this information. In an online context, 
that individual might control how confidants can 
act/interact within his or her private virtual territory by 
eliminating their ability to tag posts. In this research we 
assert that the higher the perceived information privacy 
risk (i.e., high privacy risk beliefs), the higher the 
likelihood individuals will establish a more 
inaccessible boundary around their private virtual 
territory (high territory coordination).   
H11: On a social networking site, individuals’ 
perceived information privacy risk beliefs will 
positively influence their territory coordination.  
The theory of territoriality proposed by Brown et al. 
(2005) suggests that individual territory privacy 
management behavior is influenced by territory 
privacy risk beliefs (Altman, 1975; Brown et al., 2005). 
The theory of territoriality states that when individuals 
perceive a greater likelihood of infringement into their 
territory, they will take action to prevent others from 
invading the territory (i.e., anticipatory defenses; 
Brown et al., 2005; Dyson-Hudson & Smith, 1978; 
Edney, 1975, 1976). From CPM theory, regarding a 
virtual private territory, high privacy risk evaluation 
means that the individual feels vulnerable when 
granting access to the private virtual territory. 
Individuals who perceive a high potential for loss due 
to sharing their private virtual territory with a confidant 




group (i.e., territory privacy risk beliefs) are likely to 
increase their management of the private virtual 
territory (i.e., territory coordination). On SNSs, 
individuals who have high territory privacy risk beliefs 
may anticipate a high likelihood of loss resulting from 
allowing access to their private virtual territory, and thus 
may more tightly control their private virtual territory. 
For example, if Sandra perceives a high potential for 
“invasion” of her private virtual territory by unknown 
others, she may take preventative action such as adding 
a mechanism to review new members to ensure that only 
certain confidants have access to her territory.  
H12: On a social networking site, individuals’ 
perceived territory privacy risk beliefs will 
positively influence their territory coordination.  
2.3.7 Information Sensitivity and Privacy 
Management Behavior  
Sensitive information is information that is important 
to the individual and might result in negative 
consequences if revealed to certain individuals 
(Phelps, Nowak, & Ferrell, 2000). Previous research 
has found that more sensitive information negatively 
affects the disclosure of information online in an e-
commerce context (e.g., Malhotra et al., 2004; 
McKnight et al., 2011; Yang & Wang, 2009), and an 
SNS context (James, Wallace, Warkentin, Kim, & 
Collignon, 2017). We confirm this finding to establish 
that in an SNS context individuals will be less likely to 
share information that they feel is sensitive so that we 
can compare the relationship with the information 
sensitivity / territory coordination relationship.  
H13: On a social networking site, the level of 
information sensitivity will negatively 
influence individuals’ private disclosure. 
The more valuable something is, the more we protect 
it. We see this in everyday life, with car alarms, home 
security systems, and computer passwords. Sensitive 
information is important and valuable to the individual. 
The results of its misuse can be significant (e.g., 
embarrassing, financially costly), and thus, sensitive 
information is worthy of being protected. Within an 
SNS context, to protect sensitive information from 
being misused individuals may regulate the level of 
access to and interaction within their virtual territories. 
In essence, individuals may more tightly control the 
virtual territory boundary by controlling which SNS 
confidant group members may view, tag, and/or 
discuss what information. We further argue that the 
more sensitive the information, the more individuals 
may coordinate with their SNS confidant group 
                                                          
2  Esurance commercial “That’s Not How This Works!” 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Aq_1l316ow8).   
 
members (i.e., more tightly control access) regarding 
their virtual territories.  
H14: On a social networking site, the level of 
information sensitivity will positively influence 
individuals’ territory coordination. 
3 Research Method 
We conducted two empirical studies to explore our 
model. Study 1 empirically validated the 
conceptual distinction between information and 
territory related to privacy on an SNS. Study 2 
tested the research model and hypotheses.  
3.1 Study 1 
The objective of Study 1 was to develop a new scale to 
measure the concept of a virtual territory and 
empirically examine it as distinct from the concept of 
an SNS and the information contained on the SNS. To 
identify various forms of virtual territories, we first 
reviewed the relevant literature regarding territories 
(Altman, 1975; Brown et al., 2005; Brown & 
Robinson, 2011) and online social networks (Lewis, 
Kaufman, & Christakis, 2008; Steinfield, Ellison, & 
Lampe, 2008), and then conducted a qualitative inquiry 
through individual interviews with 20 undergraduate 
students from a southeastern university in the United 
States participating in a basic computer competency 
class (12 males and 8 females) who reported SNS use 
within the last 30 days. The interviews were conducted 
to determine the applicability of the focal constructs to 
the study context. Specifically, we wanted to identify 
whether individuals make a conceptual distinction 
between information and territory within the context of 
SNSs. The interviewees had a variety of majors (e.g., 
psychology, business, political science, etc.) with 50% 
of the participants from business disciplines. 
Interviewees highlighted the distinction between the 
information they place in their virtual territories and 
the territories themselves. We asked participants 
how they might define/describe the term virtual 
territory, as well as whether there are differences 
between information and territory and between 
information privacy and territory privacy. For 
example, when asked, “What is a virtual territory?” 
participants made statements like 
Your Facebook wall could be considered 
your virtual territory, because it’s your area. 
The use of the word wall is kind of a decent 
idea. Kind of like that commercial2 that came 
out where that older woman she says you’re 
not my friend anymore and pulls that 




person’s picture off the wall. The idea of a 
virtual wall is a [virtual] territory. (Zack) 
Like your own personal, your own space or 
confinement within the internet. For 
instance, Instagram, my Instagram, that’s 
like my virtual territory. (Brian) 
My profile is my virtual territory because 
it’s under my control. Like I have it set up 
so if someone tags me in a picture it doesn’t 
automatically go to my page, I have to 
approve it. (Cassandra) 
As a result of the literature review and qualitative data, 
a conceptual definition and pool of items were created 
to reflect a virtual territory within but distinct from 
SNSs. The pool included 4 items describing SNSs, 2 
items describing private information, and 8 items 
describing a virtual territory. A structured 
questionnaire was developed based on the pool of 
items. All items used a seven-point Likert-type scale 
ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly 
agree” (7). Appendix A, Table A1 contains the 
construct definitions and measurement items for each 
construct. The survey was administered to students in an 
introductory computer class at a large southeastern US 
university who reported SNS use within the previous 30 
days. For this study we collected 156 completed 
questionnaires (five responses were dropped due to 
incomplete data). Men (49%) and women (51%) were 
almost equally represented and 93% of the participants 
were between 18 and 25 years of age. Participants 
reported an average of 5.4 years of SNS use.  
To further explore the potential distinction between 
perceptions of privacy regarding online territories and 
online information, we performed an exploratory 
factor analysis using SPSS 21 on the items. Each of the 
items loaded higher than 0.70 on the appropriate factor 
and at the same time loaded less than 0.40 on other 
factors with the exception of one item (VT8). This 
item was removed from further analysis due to the 
low loading. Table 1 shows the result of the factor 
analysis and scale reliability. 
We also performed a paired-samples t-test to compare 
the means of the variables (virtual territory mean = 
5.23, social network mean = 5.57, private information 
mean = 5.95) and found a statistically significant 
difference (virtual territory and social network t = 2.89, 
df = 155, p = 0.004; virtual territory and private 
information t = 7.11, df = 155, p = 0.000; and social 
network and private information t = 3.36, df = 155, p = 
0.001). The results indicate that the participants 
discriminated between the concepts of information, 
online social networks, and virtual territories. Given 
this finding, we proceeded to further explore the 
research question (What factors influence how 
individuals manage their information privacy and 
territory privacy in SNSs?) via an empirical test of the 
research model in Figure 2. 
Table 1. Study 1 Factor Analysis and Scale Reliability 
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Cronbach’s alpha 
INFO1 0.87   
0.74 
INFO2 0.89   
SNT1  0.85  
0.90 
SNT2  0.92  
SNT3  0.91  
SNT4  0.83  
VT1   0.83 
0.92 
VT2   0.85 
VT3   0.82 
VT4   0.85 
VT5   0.81 
VT6   0.82 
VT7   0.74 
 




3.2 Study 2 
Since this research emphasizes explaining variance 
and developing causal relationships, we used a field 
study methodology and performed statistical analysis 
using structural equation modeling. 
3.2.1 Measure Development 
For the constructs that had been previously developed 
and had valid and reliable measures (e.g., information 
privacy concerns, information trusting beliefs, and 
information privacy risk beliefs) (Malhotra et al. 
2004), we adapted the measure to the SNS context. If 
no measure was available, we used the procedures 
suggested by Schwab (2005) to develop the measure. 
First, we clearly defined the construct based on the 
theory that informs the construct. Second, we 
developed the measures to be consistent with the 
construct definition. Third, to ensure the measure’s 
content validity, we reviewed each item to make sure 
the items accurately captured the construct definition. 
Fourth, to ensure face validity, we invited three SNS 
members to review the wording of the items and the 
scales, and we reworded the items until consensus was 
reached. Fifth, we conducted a pilot test and then refined 
or added items based on the pilot test results. Appendix 
A, Table A2 contains the construct definitions, 
measurement items and sources for each construct. 
There are three dimensions to information privacy 
concerns: collection, control, and awareness (Malhotra 
et al., 2004). We modified items in the collection 
dimension of information privacy concerns to reflect 
the nature of the information flow 3  on SNSs. The 
measure reflects the degree to which an individual is 
concerned about the private information divulged to 
confidants and was developed based on similar 
measures in the literature (Jiang et al., 2013; 
Wheeless & Grotz, 1976).  
To measure territory privacy concerns, territory 
trusting beliefs, and territory privacy risk beliefs, we 
developed measures based on Altman’s (1975) 
territory privacy theory, Malhotra et al.’s (2004) theory 
of internet privacy, Petronio’s (2002) CPM theory, and 
our results from Study 1, using the procedure detailed 
previously. In Malhotra et al.’s (2004) theory of 
internet privacy, social contract theory is used to draw 
the three dimensions of information privacy concerns. 
Because territory privacy concerns, like information 
privacy concerns, captures how an individual 
perceives fairness in an exchange, we used social 
contract theory and Altman’s notion of territory to 
develop the three dimensions of territory privacy 
concerns: access, control, and awareness. An 
                                                          
3 The original items in the collection dimension reflects the 
fact that the organization collects private information from 
individual perceives territory privacy practices to be 
fair (low territory privacy concerns) when confidants’ 
“access” to the private virtual territory is perceived to 
be fair, when the individual has “control” over the 
private virtual territory, and when the individual is 
“aware” of the confidants’ behavior intention within 
the private virtual territory.  
In CPM theory, there are three types of territory 
coordination: linkage, permeability, and ownership 
(Petronio, 2002). Linkage coordination (five items) 
refers to managing who can access an individual’s 
private virtual territory. For example, an individual 
may write a post and limit the “linkages” by inviting 
only family members to view and reply. Permeability 
coordination (five items) refers to managing how 
difficult a private virtual territory is for others to 
access. An individual can differentiate multiple virtual 
territories with different levels of accessibility. For 
example, through a password or other mechanisms, 
one may make a specific online photo album more 
difficult to access (less permeable) than other albums. 
Ownership coordination (seven items) refers to 
managing who has rights and privileges to control an 
individual’s private virtual territory. Allowing others 
to have ownership means allowing them to have 
control over an area of an individual’s private virtual 
territory. For example, individuals can determine 
whether or not to grant their confidants the right to 
invite (tag) other friends to see their online photos.  
Among the measurement items for territory 
coordination, some items were adapted from Child et 
al. (2009), some were newly added, and some were 
dropped. There are two primary reasons for this 
approach. First, Child et al.’s (2009) measure reflects 
privacy management practices regarding the 
management of private information in a blog 
environment. Our study differentiates the behavior for 
managing private information (i.e., private disclosure) 
and the behavior for managing private virtual 
territories (i.e., territory coordination). Therefore, 
some items from Child et al. (2009), such as “I have 
limited the personal information posted on my blog”, 
were dropped because they capture private disclosure 
rather than territory coordination. Other items, such as 
“I place my SNS members in different groups and share 
my virtual territory with different groups”, were added 
because they reflect individual behavior to manage 
private virtual territories (i.e., territory coordination). A 
second reason for the modification is because Child et 
al.’s (2009) measure was developed specifically for a 
blogging context, and as such the wording of some items 
was adapted to the SNS context. 
transactions in the B2C context. However, in SNSs the 
individual shares private information to confidants.  




All items used a seven-point Likert-type scale ranging 
from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (7). 
Following the decision rules described by Jarvis, 
MacKenzie, and Podsakoff (2003) and MacKenzie et 
al. (2005), and consistent with previous research on 
online privacy management (Child et al., 2009; Malhotra 
et al., 2004), information trusting beliefs, territory trusting 
beliefs, information privacy risk beliefs, and territory 
privacy risk beliefs were modeled as first-order reflective 
constructs. We modeled information privacy concerns 
and territory privacy concerns as reflective first-order and 
reflective second-order constructs (Child et al., 2009; 
Malhotra et al., 2004).  
A second-order latent construct has formative 
dimensions when: (1) all the dimensions together 
define the concept domain of the second-order latent 
construct, (2) changes in one dimension result in 
changes in the second-order latent construct, and (3) 
each dimension uniquely captures a concept domain of 
the second-order latent construct (Jarvis et al., 2003; 
MacKenzie et al., 2005). We modeled territory 
coordination as a reflective first-order and formative 
second-order construct as it met these criteria.  
We included several factors as control variables, 
because while they are not included in the research 
model, it has been suggested in the literature that they 
have an influence on privacy-related attitudes and 
behaviors (Malhotra et al., 2004; Posey et al., 2010; 
Xu, Teo, Tan, & Agarwal, 2009). These variables 
include gender, native language, education, SNS 4, 
tenure in the SNS, number of connections, and 
weekly hours spent in SNS (see Appendix A for a 
description of these measures). In addition, 
considering some SNSs provide more tools for 
territory coordination than others, we included 
technological features as a control variable.  
3.2.2 Data Collection 
We designed the questionnaire with two different 
scenarios (i.e., low versus high information sensitivity) 
to investigate how individuals’ privacy management 
behavior differs on the basis of the type of information 
shared. In scenario A (less sensitive information), 
participants were asked by their friends to share (on 
their SNS) photos taken at 2:00 p.m. in a local park, 
where they are sitting around a picnic table, eating bar-
b-que and drinking tea. In scenario B (more sensitive 
information), participants were asked by their friends 
to share (on their SNS) photos taken at 2:00 a.m. in a 
local nightclub, where they are sitting around a table 
drinking (alcohol) and some were smoking/vaping. 
Participants were randomly assigned one of the two 
scenarios. Participants in both scenarios were 
                                                          
4 Our thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
presented with the same measurement items. This 
study collected data from undergraduate business 
students at a large southeastern university in the United 
States. The participants were “active” users,5 since the 
individuals had visited an SNS within the last 30 days. 
We collected data using an online self-report survey 
instrument. Empirical evidence suggests that a 
separation of two to three weeks between the 
measurement of variables is an effective technique for 
reducing common method variance (Johnson, Rosen, 
& Djurdjevic, 2011, study 2). To minimize the 
possibility of common method variance, we collected 
the data in two stages (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, 
& Podsakoff, 2003), with a minimum of 14 days 
between the two surveys. 
In the first stage, participants responded to the 
questions measuring personal disposition factors and 
context-specific factors. When responding to questions 
regarding personal disposition factors such as 
information privacy concerns and territory privacy 
concerns, participants were asked to rate their level of 
agreement with the measurement items in general (not 
specific to any SNS or scenario). When answering 
questions regarding context-specific factors including 
information trusting beliefs, territory trusting beliefs, 
information privacy risk beliefs, and territory privacy 
risk beliefs, participants were asked to respond 
referencing a specific SNS. Participants were asked to 
think about the SNS that they used the most during the 
past 30 days. In the second stage, each participant was 
randomly assigned to one scenario (scenario A or 
scenario B) and responded to questions measuring 
private disclosure and territory coordination 
referencing the scenario provided.  
4 Results 
4.1 Sample Characteristics 
The questionnaire was given to 265 participants. 
Overall, 246 participants completed the first-stage 
survey (a 93% response rate) and 195 participants took 
the second stage survey (79% of stage-one participants 
took the stage-two survey). As a result of data cleansing, 
168 responses were valid for further analysis. See Table 
2 for the demographics of the final sample.  
 
5  Facebook help page “What is a monthly active user?” 
(https://www.facebook.com/help/work/1101646006616660
?helpref=uf_permalink).  




Table 2. Demographics 
Gender 
Female = 52% 
Tenure in the SNS 
Less than 2 years = 9% 
Male = 48% 2-4 years = 22% 
Age 
18-25 = 97% 4-6 years = 36% 
26 or above = 3% 6 years or more = 33% 
Native 
Language 
English = 90% 
Number of Connections 
Less than 200 = 18% 
Spanish = 8% 201-400 = 23% 
Other = 2% 401-600 = 17% 
Education 
High School diploma = 45%  601-800 = 11% 
Associate’s degree = 48%  801 or above = 30% 
Bachelor’s degree = 7%  
Weekly Hours Spent in SNS 
Less than 2 hours = 14% 
Social 
Networking Site 
Facebook = 35% 3-6 hours = 30% 
Instagram = 29% 7-10 hours = 27% 
Snapchat = 21% 11-14hours = 14% 
Twitter = 8% 15-18 hours = 6% 
Other = 10%  19 or above = 9% 
4.2 Measurement Model Assessment 
The first stage of data analysis focused on the 
psychometric adequacy of the measurement model. 
The measures are reliable, as the composite 
reliabilities of all the constructs/dimensions ranged 
from 0.83 to 0.97 which are within the appropriate 
range (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988; Garver & Mentzer, 1999). 
See Table 3 for the composite reliability and 
Cronbach’s alpha for each construct. 
We conducted an exploratory factor analysis to obtain 
the preliminary evidence for convergent and 
discriminant validity (see Appendix A, Tables A3—
A7 for factor loadings). For the second-order 
constructs, we grouped the measurement items under 
their respective second-order construct for the factor 
analysis, as demonstrated in Rai, Patnayakuni, and Seth’s 
(2006) study. The results show that all of the item loadings 
were above 0.60 on the latent constructs/dimensions, and 
below 0.40 on the other constructs/dimensions (Hair, 
Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998). Also, the high 
eigenvalues (>1) of all latent constructs provides 
preliminary evidence for convergent validity.  
We used the maximum likelihood estimation of 
structural equation modeling to confirm the 
psychometric adequacy of the measurement model. 
The measurement model fits the data well (χ2 (df = 
952, n= 168) = 1577.11, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.90, 
TLI = 0.89, SRMR = 0.08, PCFI = 0.82). The chi-
square and the RMSEA indicate that our measurement 
model predicts the observed covariance matrix well. 
The CFI and TLI indicate that the measurement model fit 
the data well relative to the null model. The PCFI shows 
that the model is parsimonious and fits the data well. 
We used two additional approaches to assess further 
evidence for convergent validity. First, measures show 
convergent validity when the standardized loadings are 
at least 0.70 or the average variance extracted (AVE) 
is greater than 0.50 (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). As 
observed in Table 3, both indicators suggest 
convergence in measurement (Bagozzi, 1981). 
Second, convergent validity is shown when items load 
significantly on their respective latent 
construct/dimension (Gefen & Straub, 2005). For 
second-order reflective constructs, measures show 
convergent validity when the path coefficient of a 
dimension loading onto its latent construct is 
significant (see Table 4). Thus, convergent validity is 
indicated for the measures. 
We used three additional approaches to assess 
discriminant validity. First, measures showed 
discriminant validity when the square root of each 
AVE is larger than its correlation with any other latent 
constructs/dimensions (i.e., the Fornell-Larcker 
criterion; Chin, 1998a; Fornell & Larcker, 1981) (see 
Table 5). Second, the item-construct correlations (see 
Appendix B for the details) showed that the correlation 
of an item with its latent construct/dimension is greater 
than its correlations with other constructs/dimensions 
(Chin, 1998b; Gefen & Straub, 2005). 




Table 3. AVEs, Construct Reliabilities, and Cronbach’s Alpha 
 AVE Composite reliability Cronbach’s alpha 
IPC_Collection 0.88 0.96 0.93 
IPC_Control 0.68 0.87 0.77 
IPC_Aware 0.90 0.97 0.96 
TPC_Access 0.78 0.91 0.86 
TPC_Control 0.62 0.83 0.69 
TPC_Aware 0.83 0.94 0.90 
ITB 0.82 0.95 0.94 
TTB 0.78 0.93 0.91 
IPRB 0.80 0.92 0.87 
TPRB 0.86 0.95 0.92 
PD 0.70 0.90 0.86 
TC_Linkage 0.74 0.89 0.82 
TC_Permeability 0.78 0.91 0.85 
TC_Ownership 0.91 0.97 0.95 
Technological Features 0.86 0.95 0.92 
 
Table 4. Path Coefficients of Dimensions on Latent Constructs 
Construct Dimension Type 
Path coefficients 




Reflective first-order, reflective 
second-order 
0.75 16.66 p < 0.001 
Control 0.77 14.97 p < 0.001 




Reflective first-order, reflective 
second-order 
0.72 11.94 p < 0.001 
Control 0.76 16.61 p < 0.001 




Reflective first-order, formative 
second-order 
0.36 21.20 p < 0.001 
Ownership 0.38 20.10 p < 0.001 
Permeability 0.45 19.71 p < 0.001 




Third, we conducted the fixed and freed method 
(Anderson & Gerbing, 1988; Jöreskog, 1971) to 
examine the discriminant validity for three pairs of 
constructs. The chi-square difference test suggested 
the measures for these constructs discriminate: 
information privacy concerns and territory privacy 
concerns (∆χ2= 18.50, p < 0.001), information trusting 
beliefs and territory trusting beliefs (∆χ2= 7.80, p < 
0.01), and information privacy risk beliefs and territory 
privacy risk beliefs (∆χ2= 21.80, p < 0.001). 
Territory coordination is a construct with formative 
dimensions and reflective indicators (Type II 
constructs) (Jarvis et al., 2003; MacKenzie et al., 
2005). For construct validity, we used item weights 
rather than item loadings as evidence of construct 
validity of formative constructs (Diamantopoulos & 
Winklhofer, 2001; Petter, Straub, & Rai, 2007). As the 
first-order dimensions had items as reflective 
indicators, significant item weights on their 
dimensions were not necessary. However, for the 
second-order dimensions, significant path coefficients 
indicated that the dimension explained a significant 
portion of variance in the latent construct. For 
evaluating the psychometric adequacy of formative 
constructs, convergent validity (Jarvis et al., 2003), 
composite reliabilities and Cronbach’s alpha (Bollen, 
1984; Chin, 1998b) were not required. The variance 
inflation factor (VIF) of the formative constructs 
ranged from 1.43 to 1.91 and were well below the 3.3 
cut-off criterion (Diamantopoulos & Siguaw, 2006; 
Petter et al., 2007), suggesting the formative indicators 
were not highly correlated (Petter et al., 2007). 
In addition to the two-phase data collection procedure, 
two statistical analyses suggested no evidence of the 
threat of common method bias. First, Harman’s one-
factor test showed the first factor accounted for only 
21.9% of the total variance (a common methods bias 
problem presents if a single factor accounted for a large 
percentage of the variance). Second, we performed a 
marker variable test as suggested by Lindell and 
Whitney (2001). We used two variables that should 
have no relationship with the constructs of interest: (1) 
satisfaction with a car insurance company, and (2) the 
intention to take a long trip soon. The smallest 
correlation was 0.005, suggesting no correction was 
needed (based on Jayachandran, Sharma, Kaufman, & 
Raman, 2005; Richardson, Simmering, & Sturman, 
2009). The results indicate that common method bias 
is unlikely to be a serious concern with this data. 
4.3 Structural Model Assessment 
We used partial least squares modeling (SmartPLS 2.0; 
Ringle, Wende, & Will, 2006) to evaluate the research 
model and test the hypotheses. To examine the 
hypotheses, we assessed the significance of the path 
coefficients through bootstrapping of 1500 subsamples 
(Chin, 1998a). Figure 3 graphically presents the results 
of the path analysis, and Table 6 presents the results of 
the hypothesis testing. The results indicate that the 
research model explained 24.1% of the variance in 
territory coordination, 18.2% of the variance in private 
disclosure, 40.2% of the variance in the information 
privacy risk beliefs, and 19.2% of the variance in the 
territory privacy risk beliefs.  
Among the control variables, only the path coefficient 
from social networking sites to private disclosure (β = 
0.22, t = 2.30, p < 0.05) was significant. This result 
suggests that participants that use different social 
networking sites may view private disclosure differently. 
The findings show that individuals’ territory privacy 
risk beliefs have no direct influence on territory 
coordination (H12, nonsignificant), and that with high 
territory privacy risk beliefs, individuals will perceive 
that the private information placed within the territory 
is at risk (H7). One plausible explanation for H12 
being nonsignificant is that information privacy risk 
beliefs mediate the influence of territory privacy risk 
beliefs on territory coordination. Related to this, we 
performed a post hoc analysis to examine if/how 
territory coordination mediates the influence of 
information privacy risk beliefs on private disclosure 
(see Appendix C). We used two complementary 
approaches to examine the significance of the direct 
and indirect effects: the Sobel z-test (Sobel, 1982), and 
the significance test of the effect size (ƒ2) following 
Cohen’s (1988) and Chin, Marcolin, and Newsted’s 
(2003) approach. Then, following Zhao, Lynch, and 
Chen’s (2010) procedure, we examined the existence 
and type of mediation effects. Finally, we calculated 
the variance accounted for (VAF) (Helm, Eggert, & 
Garnefeld, 2010) to evaluate the magnitude of the 
mediation effects. The results confirm that information 
privacy risk beliefs fully mediate the influence of 
territory privacy risk beliefs on territory coordination 
(Sobel Z=1.997, p < 0.05, VAF = 25.2%). Appendix C 
presents all other mediation tests and procedures.  
Another plausible explanation for H12 being 
nonsignificant might be that territory privacy risk 
beliefs have an influence on some but not all of the 
dimensions of territory coordination, which was 
obscured in the aggregation process. We performed a 
post hoc analysis to determine if territory risk beliefs 
directly influenced the dimensions of territory 
coordination. The results indicate that territory privacy 
risk beliefs did not significantly influence any of the 
individual territory coordination dimensions (linkage β 
= 0.07, p = nonsignificant; permeability β = 0.13, p = 
nonsignificant; ownership β = 0.03, p = 
nonsignificant), further confirming full mediation.
  










Figure 3. Results of Path Analysis 
 
Table 6. Summary of Hypotheses Testing 
Hypothesis Relationships between constructs (direction of relationship) Results Support 
H1 Information privacy concerns  Information trusting beliefs (-) β = 0.03 t = 0.28 
Not 
supported 
H2 Territory privacy concerns  Territory trusting beliefs (-) β = 0.33 t = 5.16 
Not  
Supported* 
H3 Information privacy concerns  Information privacy risk beliefs (+) β = 0.56 t = 9.44 
Supported 
(p < 0.001) 
H4 Territory privacy concerns  Territory privacy risk beliefs (+) β = 0.45 t = 6.62 
Supported 
 (p < 0.001) 
H5 Information trusting beliefs  Information privacy risk beliefs (-) β = -0.12 t = 1.56 
Not 
supported 
H6 Territory trusting beliefs  Territory privacy risk beliefs (-) β = -0.05 t = 0.64 
Not 
supported 
H7 Territory privacy risk beliefs  Information privacy risk beliefs (+) β = 0.18 t = 2.71 
Supported 
(p < 0.01) 
H8 Information trusting beliefs  Private disclosure (+) β = 0.18 t = 2.43 
Supported 
(p < 0.05) 
H9 Territory trusting beliefs  Territory coordination (-) β = 0.07 t = 0.93 
Not 
supported 
H10 Information privacy risk beliefs  Private disclosure (-) β = -0.11 t = 1.20 
Not 
supported 
H11 Information privacy risk beliefs  Territory coordination (+) β = 0.26 t = 3.04 
Supported 
(p < 0.01) 
H12 Territory privacy risk beliefs  Territory coordination (+) β = 0.14 t = 1.82 
Not 
supported 
H13 Information sensitivity  Private disclosure (-) β = -0.21 t = 2.45 
Supported 
(p < 0.05) 
H14 Information sensitivity  Territory coordination (+) β = 0.22 t = 2.73 
Supported 
(p < 0.01) 
Note: * The relationship was significant, but in the opposite direction of the hypothesis.  





The underlying premise of this research is that in 
order to manage privacy on SNSs, individuals 
should determine what information to reveal 
(information privacy), as well as whom they allow 
access to and with whom they interact in their 
private virtual territories (territory privacy). Based 
on this premise we explored factors that influence 
how individuals manage their information privacy 
and territory privacy on SNSs. 
Regarding the causal relationships in the information 
privacy theoretical framework (between information 
privacy concerns, information trusting beliefs, 
information privacy risk beliefs, and private 
disclosure), the findings of this study are mixed. 
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Hong & Thong, 
2013; Malhotra et al., 2004), H3 and H8 were 
supported, but counter to previous findings (e.g., 
Malhotra et al., 2004; Shibchurn & Yan, 2015) H1, H5 
and H10 were not supported. These findings indicate 
that in an SNS context trust may not play the same role 
in information disclosure as in an e-commerce context; 
and that the inclusion of the territory privacy construct 
may influence the relationships within the private 
disclosure framework. The findings also suggest that 
in the theoretical framework of territory privacy, 
territory privacy concerns and territory privacy risk 
beliefs have a significant relationship (H4).  
When viewed holistically, the model tells a particularly 
interesting story. The findings indicate that both 
information and territory privacy concerns are key distal 
antecedents of privacy management behavior within an 
SNS context as they strongly and significantly influence 
the respective risk beliefs. In addition, both information 
and territory risk beliefs play significant roles in 
determining privacy management behavior, and 
specifically territory coordination.  
Also, the relationship between information privacy risk 
beliefs and territory coordination was supported, but 
not the relationship between territory privacy risk 
beliefs and territory coordination. A post hoc analysis 
indicated that information privacy risk beliefs fully 
mediated the impact of territory privacy risk beliefs on 
territory coordination. Thus, the perception of potential 
loss due to allowing SNS members access to one’s 
private virtual territory alone is not sufficient 
motivation for individuals to increase their territory 
coordination unless they perceive that the information 
within the private virtual territory is also at risk. 
Finally, as hypothesized, the sensitivity of the 
information significantly influenced the level of 
private disclosure (-) and territory coordination (+). 
This finding is consistent with previous research in 
both an e-commerce setting (e.g., Mothersbaugh, 
Foxx, Beatty, & Wang, 2012) and an SNS setting (e.g., 
Cheung et al., 2015; Hajli & Lin, 2016). Given this 
consistent finding, we speculate that an individual may 
disclose less in public virtual territories and more in 
private virtual territories because the individual can 
better control the level of access to and interaction 
within the private virtual territory. 
5.1 Implications  
The findings suggest two main implications for theory. 
First, the findings reveal that to have a comprehensive 
understanding of online privacy issues concerning 
SNSs, researchers should consider both information 
privacy and territory privacy. Previous privacy-related 
IS research has examined the antecedents of 
information privacy (e.g., Dinev & Hart, 2004; 
Malhotra et al., 2004), and hinted at multiple 
dimensions of privacy (e.g., Malhotra et al., 2004; 
Smith, Milburg, & Burke, 1996) but has not 
systematically investigated different types of privacy 
(e.g., information and territory). The findings from this 
study tell us that the antecedents and outcomes of 
information privacy and territory privacy are different. 
In other words, the level of territory privacy cannot 
simply be inferred by the assessment of information 
privacy, and vice versa. The findings show that the 
level of information privacy risk beliefs is determined 
not only by information privacy concerns, but also by 
territory privacy risk beliefs. Given that information 
privacy risk beliefs fully mediate the effect of territory 
privacy risk beliefs on territory coordination, 
researchers should consider how the perceived risks 
regarding the virtual territory influence the perceived 
risks of the information and territory boundary 
coordination efforts. While there can be different types 
of privacy, these findings suggest that the level of one 
type of privacy risk cannot be summarily inferred from 
another. Future research should explore the extent of 
the differences in antecedents of the two types of 
privacy risk beliefs in multiple SNS contexts. Future 
research on privacy on SNSs might study how 
information privacy risk beliefs and territory privacy 
risk beliefs may influence SNS participation. For 
example, would information privacy risk beliefs and 
territory privacy risk beliefs influence SNS 
participation in the same way? 
Second, this study suggests that in the SNS context, 
territory coordination is a more evident indicator of 
individuals’ privacy management behavior than is 
private disclosure. Prior research of privacy mainly 
adopted private disclosure (or similar concepts) as the 
behavioral outcome and used it as the indicator of 
individual privacy management behavior. However, 
our study suggests that in the SNS context, territory 
coordination is a significant behavioral outcome of 
information privacy risk beliefs, whereas private 
disclosure is not. These results imply that individuals 
on SNSs may rely more on territory coordination as the 




privacy management behavior than on private 
disclosure. Future research should revisit how 
individuals in a variety of contexts manage their 
privacy and how territory privacy management 
behavior and information privacy management 
behavior influence participation. 
In addition to theoretical contributions, there are also 
implications for practice. This study found that 
addressing individuals’ territory privacy concerns may 
help SNS platform organizations mitigate individual 
evaluations of territory privacy risk (and ultimately 
information privacy risk). As the findings indicate, if 
an individual has high territory privacy concerns, the 
individual will also have high territory privacy risk 
beliefs. To mitigate access concerns, SNS platform 
organizations could implement a variety of 
mechanisms to encourage individuals to share their 
virtual territories. For example, Facebook provides 
mobile applications to encourage users to share photos 
(i.e., private information) and interact with others in 
the photo comment area (i.e., private virtual territory). 
To mitigate control concerns, organizations could 
provide (or improve) tools for individuals to manage 
the accessibility of the private virtual territory to SNS 
members. To mitigate awareness concerns, 
organizations could use tools such as online help to 
guide individuals to the default territory privacy practices 
settings of SNS members and different territory privacy 
practices that are available to SNS members. These 
settings may help SNS platform providers decrease the 
perceived risks to users’ private virtual territories, (and 
ultimately of sharing private information), potentially 
increasing participation and satisfaction with SNSs and 
potentially increasing revenue. 
The second implication for practice, especially for 
organizations that host social networking platforms 
(e.g., Twitter, Facebook), is about how to facilitate 
territory coordination and encourage individuals to 
share private information. For these organizations, the 
business model is simple—the more users, the more 
revenue (e.g., Facebook made an average of $7.37 in 
revenue per user in 2018). 6  Research suggests that 
every additional connection (direct or indirect) within 
one’s online social network raises a user’s barrier to 
leave the network (Algesheimer & Von Wangenheim, 
2006; Xu, Lu, Goh, Jiang, & Zhu, 2009). Network 
members’ activity is highly relevant for advertising 
effectiveness, member loyalty, and a member’s 
willingness to pay for services in the online social 
network (Cheung & Lee, 2010; Ganley & Lampe, 
2009; Krasnova, Hildebrand, & Günther, 2009; 
Oestreicher-Singer & Zalmanson, 2009; Xu, Zhang, 
Xue, & Yeo, 2008). Therefore, organizations that host 
                                                          
6  According to https://www.statista.com/statistics/251328/ 
facebooks-average-revenue-per-user-by-region/. 
social networking platforms might use the findings 
from this study to increase the number of users and 
increase user retention by encouraging users to manage 
their privacy more effectively and provide tools and/or 
techniques to support individuals in effectively 
protecting their private virtual territory.  
The third implication for practice indicates that the 
three types of territory coordination behavior (linkage, 
permeability, ownership) also have implications for 
organizations that host social networking platforms. A 
survey of SNS users has observed the trend that 
individuals are becoming more active in managing 
their virtual territories on SNSs (Madden, 2012). The 
researcher found that the majority of individuals on 
SNSs (78%) set their profile to private or partially 
private so that only friends (or friends of friends) can 
see it. Moreover, among the individuals who already 
restrict the level of access to their SNS profile, a 
notable portion of them manage their friends in 
multiple groups so as to limit what specific individuals 
can and cannot see.  
Our conceptualization of territory coordination 
suggests three types of tools and/or techniques that an 
SNS platform organization could provide for 
individuals to facilitate the management of private 
virtual territories. For example, to support linkage 
coordination, some SNSs allow individuals to 
determine to whom a message box or a photo album 
(private virtual territory) is accessible. SNS platforms 
could add finer-grained selection tools so that SNS 
members could control exactly who can and cannot 
access subsets of their virtual territories. To support 
permeability coordination, SNS platform organizations 
could provide finer-grained tools for individuals to 
configure the accessibility of the private virtual 
territory, so that individuals can manage their private 
virtual territories with different boundaries, such as a 
nonaccess virtual territory boundary and several 
collective virtual territory boundaries. For example, a 
simulation tool that enables individuals to see what 
their friends may see, or a visualization tool such as a 
dashboard of virtual territory accessibility, might help 
individuals manage boundary permeability. To support 
ownership coordination, some SNSs allow individuals 
to delete unwanted comments from SNS members. 
Also, SNSs could introduce a badge mechanism 
through which individuals can authorize administrative 
privileges to friends using various badges. By 
providing these tools, SNS platform organizations 
might facilitate greater levels of comfort among 
individuals sharing their virtual territories with others. 




5.2 Limitations and Future Research 
Care must be taken when generalizing the findings 
beyond the boundary of the study context (SNS). 
Given the fact that there are several types of virtual 
communities, the findings of this study should be 
generalized outside the SNS context with caution. 
Individuals participating in other types of virtual 
communities may have privacy perceptions and privacy 
management behavior patterns that are different from 
those using SNSs. Future research could examine 
whether the findings in this study are generalizable to 
additional SNS platforms and virtual communities (e.g., 
virtual worlds, StackOverflow, or SourceForge). 
In addition, this research assumed that virtual 
territories are nested within virtual communities (i.e., 
we asked survey respondents to answer the survey 
questions with one focal SNS in mind). An alternative 
view is that a private virtual territory is a combination 
of smaller territories scattered across various virtual 
communities, especially given the fact that many of 
these communities are technologically intertwined. 
Thus, our assumption may be a limitation of the study. 
Future research could focus on detailing the perceived 
relationship between virtual territories and virtual 
communities. Related to this issue is the potential 
temporal aspect of privacy management on SNSs. In 
answer to the question, does one form of privacy 
precede another (i.e., does territory privacy occur 
before or after information privacy)? We see examples 
of territory privacy occurring first (e.g., establish 
territory boundaries when creating a social network 
profile), information privacy occurring first (e.g., do 
not disclose private information in an open SNS), and 
both occurring simultaneously (e.g., establish a new 
virtual territory on the SNS for a specific confidant 
group in which limited private information is shared). 
Future research could explore the nature of the 
relationship between these two forms of online privacy 
(including any temporal relationship).  
A characteristic of the sample to consider is the native 
language of the participants. Although efforts were 
made to include a range of participants representing 
different cultural groups, 90% of the participants were 
native English speakers. Therefore, the applicability of 
the findings to other cultural groups may be limited. As 
such, we cannot clearly derive from this study whether 
and how people from different cultural backgrounds 
may manage their territory privacy on SNSs. Future 
research could expand this study to include non-US-
based samples. Finally, we took steps to control for 
common method variance in the research design and 
in the data analysis to ensure that common method 
bias was not a concern in the data. However, a 
longitudinal research design could further validate the 
casual relationships found here.  
6 Conclusion 
This study proposed several aspects of SNSs that may 
influence an individuals’ evaluation of privacy risks, 
which in turn influences individual privacy 
management behavior (including private disclosure 
and territory coordination). Theoretically, this study 
demonstrates that a more complete conceptualization 
of privacy in SNS should consider both information 
privacy and territory privacy, and that private 
disclosure and territory coordination are 
complementary privacy management behaviors. From 
a practical standpoint, this study provides guidance to 
SNS platform organizations on potential ways to 
encourage users to share private information as a 
mechanism to increase their community population 
and potentially increase revenue. 
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Appendix A: Survey Instrument, Measures, and Factor Validity 
We used an online self-report survey instrument to collect data. The instructions and questions for Study 1 are presented 
in Table A1. All items used a seven-point Likert-type scale ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” 
(7). 
Table A1. Study 1: Survey Instructions and Questions 
The purpose of this survey is to learn about managing privacy in online social networks. Note that many questions are similar, 
so please read each question carefully. Please select the answer that corresponds to how much do you agree or disagree with 
the following statements: 
Item # Question 
INFO
1 Private information is sensitive information that you tell only under certain circumstances. 
INFO
2 Private information is sensitive information that you tell only to certain people. 
  
SNT1 An online social network refers to a group of people who interact on the Internet. 
SNT2 An online social network refers to a group of people who interact on the Internet about a specific topic (e.g. snowboarding). 
SNT3 An online social network refers to a group of people who interact on the Internet for a specific purpose (e.g. political action). 
SNT4 An online forum focused on sports is an example of an online social network. 
  
VT1 Your virtual territory is the area on a social networking site that you feel is your own. 
VT2 Your virtual territory is the space on a social networking site that you feel is yours. 
VT3 You can have multiple virtual territories on a social networking site. 
VT4 You can have multiple areas on a social networking site that you feel are your own. 
VT5 Your main page on Facebook is an example of a virtual territory in an online social network. 
VT6 An Instagram account is an example of a virtual territory in an online social network. 
VT7 Your Facebook wall (“Timeline” page) that displays all the items associated with your name is an example of a virtual territory in an online social network. 




Table A2 presents the construct definitions and the measures for Study 2. Tables A3-A7 present the measurement 
items and the results of the factor analysis. All items used a seven-point Likert-type scale ranging from “strongly 
disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (7). 
Table A2. Study 2: Summary of Constructs and Measures
Construct and definition No. of Items Measure 
Information Privacy Concerns: 
An individual’s worries about SNS members’ information privacy practices. 
Collection dimension: 
The degree to which an individual is concerned about the private information 
disclosed to SNS members (i.e., confidants) relative to the benefits received. 
Control dimension: 
The degree to which an individual is concerned about her freedom to approve, 
modify, or delete his or her private information. 
Awareness dimension: 
The degree to which an individual is concerned about his or her knowledge of the 
SNS members’ information privacy practices.  
10 Adapted from 
Malhotra et al. 
(2004) 
Territory Privacy Concerns: 
An individual’s worries about SNS members’ territory privacy practices.  
Access dimension: 
The degree to which an individual is concerned about the 
vulnerability of the private virtual territory made accessible to SNS members relative 
to the value of the benefits received. 
Control dimension: 
The degree to which an individual is concerned about his or her freedom to configure 
access to his or her private virtual territory. 
Awareness dimension: 
The degree to which an individual is concerned about his or her knowledge of the 
SNS members’ territory privacy practices. 
9 Developed 
Information Trusting Beliefs: 
The degree to which an individual believes that his or her SNS members will behave in a 
dependable manner regarding the individual’s private information.  
4 Adapted from 
Malhotra et al. 
(2004) 
Territory Trusting Beliefs: 
The degree to which an individual believes that his or her members will behave in a dependable 
manner regarding the individual’s virtual territory.  
4 Developed 
Information Privacy Risk Beliefs: 
An individual’s perception of the likelihood of loss due to sharing private information with his 
or her SNS members.  
4 Adapted from 
Malhotra et al. 
(2004) 
Territory Privacy Risk Beliefs: 
An individual’s perception of the likelihood of loss due to allowing his or her SNS members 
to access and interact in one’s virtual territory.  
4 Developed 
Private Disclosure: 
An individual’s voluntarily and intentionally revealing private information to his or her SNS 
members.  
4 Adapted from Jiang 
et al. (2013) 





An individual’s behavior to manage virtual territory accessibility with his or her SNS 
members.  
Linkage coordination: 
An individual’s behavior to manage who can access an individual’s private virtual 
territory. 
Permeability coordination: 
An individual’s behavior to manage how difficult a private virtual territory is for 
others to access. 
Ownership coordination: 
An individual’s behavior to manage who has rights and privileges to control an 
individual’s private virtual territory.  
10 Developed 
Technological Features: 
The degree to which an individual perceives that technical tools/features exist to support 
territory coordination. 
3 Developed 
Table A3. Study 2: Information Privacy Concerns Items and Factor Loadings 
Construct: 







It bothers me when I need to disclose private information about 
myself to social networking site members. IPC1 .898 .153 .174 
I sometimes think twice before disclosing private information about 
me on my social networking site. IPC2 Drop 
It bothers me to disclose private information about me to so many 
social networking site members. IPC3 .912 .175 .174 
It bothers me to disclose too much private information about me on 
my social networking site. IPC4 .892 .181 .228 
I’m concerned that I disclose too much private information about me 







Privacy in the social networking site is really a matter of my right to 
exercise control over decisions about how my private information is 
shared on my social networking site. 
IPC6 .320 .725 .088 
Control of my private information lies at the heart of privacy in the 
social networking site. IPC7 .003 .821 .266 
I believe that privacy in the social networking site is invaded when 
control over private information about me is lost or unwillingly 
reduced. 
IPC8 .242 .767 .336 
It is very important to me that I am knowledgeable about how social 







Social networking site members who want to further share my 
private information should inform me how they will discuss it. IPC10 .144 .161 .913 
Social networking site members should make it clear and 
conspicuous to me about the way my private information is 
discussed. 
IPC11 .234 .252 .871 
It is very important to me that I am knowledgeable about how social 
networking site members treat my private information. IPC12 Drop 
Social networking site members who want to further share my 
private information should inform me how they will share it. IPC13 .154 .195 .931 
Social networking site members should make it clear and obvious to 
me how my private information is shared. IPC14 .219 .265 .887 




Table A4. Study 2: Territory Privacy Concerns Items and Factor Loadings 
Construct: 







It bothers me when I consider making my virtual territory accessible 
to social networking site members. TPC1 .847 .128 .101 
I sometimes think twice before making my virtual territory accessible 
to social networking site members. TPC2 Drop 
It bothers me to make my virtual territory accessible to so many 
social networking site members. TPC3 .888 .109 .173 
It bothers me to make too much of my virtual territory accessible to 
social networking site members. TPC4 .844 .144 .115 
I’m concerned that I make too much of my virtual territory accessible 







Privacy is really a matter of my right to exercise control over 
decisions about what social networking site members DISCLOSE in 
my virtual territory. 
TPC6 .232 .675 .147 
Control of my virtual territory lies at the heart of privacy on my social 
networking site. TPC7 .061 .847 .136 
I believe that privacy in the social networking site is invaded when 







It is very important to me that I am knowledgeable about what social 
networking site members will DISCLOSE in my virtual territory. TPC9 Drop 
It is very important to me that I am knowledgeable about how social 
networking site members will INTERACT WITH OTHERS in my 
virtual territory. 
TPC10 Drop 
Social networking site members should make it clear and 
conspicuous to me what they will DISCLOSE in my virtual territory. TPC11 .201 .191 .874 
Social networking site members should make it clear and 
conspicuous to me how they will INTERACT WITH OTHERS in 
my virtual territory. 
TPC12 .084 .196 .896 
Privacy is really a matter of my right to exercise control over 
decisions about how social networking site members INTERACT 
WITH OTHERS in my virtual territory. 
TPC13 Drop 
Social networking site members should make it clear and 
conspicuous to me what they will DO in my virtual territory. TPC14 .144 .243 .849 
Social networking site members should make it clear and 
conspicuous to me how they will SHARE my virtual territory. TPC15 Drop 
 




Table A5. Study 2: Territory Coordination Items and Factor Loadings 
Construct: 













I would share my virtual territory with online social network 
members with hesitation. TC1 Drop 
I would try to figure out who is trustworthy when deciding whom I 
allow to access to my virtual territory. TC2 .797 .200 .364 
I would try to discourage other friends from visiting my virtual 
territory. TC3 .726 .329 -.032 
I would try to figure out if social networking site members are 
trustworthy when deciding whether I should make my virtual 
territory accessible. 
TC4 .810 .274 .337 
I would make my virtual territory accessible to a few selected 







I would make some areas of my virtual territory very private, while 
making others not as private. TC6 .249 .579 .440 
Not all areas of my virtual territory would be accessible to all social 
networking site members. TC7 Drop 
I would make it difficult for some people to have access to some of 
the areas of my virtual territory. TC8 Drop 
To manage my virtual territory, I would put social networking site 
members in different groups. TC9 .259 .889 .194 
Each group on my social networking site would have its own level of 







When online social network members invite their friends to VIEW 
my virtual territory (through tags or links), I may disable the 
invitations (tags) that I do not like. 
TC11 Drop 
When online social network members invite their friends to 
INTERACT in my virtual territory (through tags or links), I may 
disable the invitations (tags) that I do not like. 
TC12 Drop 
I would try to prevent online social network members from linking 
(tagging) their friends that I do not want in my virtual territory. TC13 Drop 
I may delete online social network members’ comments I do not like 
from my virtual territory. TC14 .288 .093 .734 
Online social network members should not post things in my virtual 
territory that may embarrass me. TC15 .155 .239 .873 
I would try to prevent online social network members from posting 
things in my virtual territory that may embarrass me. TC16 .134 .193 .915 
I would try to prevent online social network members from doing 
things in my virtual territory that may embarrass me. TC17 .113 .220 .902 





Table A6. Study 2: Items and Factor Loadings for TPRB, TTB, IPRB, ITB, and Technological Features 






It is risky to allow social networking site 
members to visit my virtual territory TPRB1 Drop 
It is risky to allow social networking site 
members to interact with me in my virtual 
territory. 
TPRB2 Drop 
It is risky to allow social networking site 
members to interact with others in my 
virtual territory. 
TPRB3 Drop 
There is a high potential for loss associated 
with allowing social networking site 
members to interact with me in my virtual 
territory. 
TPRB4 Drop 
There is a high potential for loss associated 
with allowing social networking site 
members to visit my virtual territory. 
TPRB5 .826 .039 .229 .060 .015 -.045 
There is too much uncertainty associated 
with allowing social networking site 
members to visit my virtual territory. 
TPRB6 .920 .028 .106 .035 -.022 -.062 
To allow social networking site members to 
visit my virtual territory involves many 
unexpected problems. 
TPRB7 Drop 
There is a high potential for loss associated 
with allowing social networking site 
members to interact with others in my 
virtual territory. 
TPRB8 Drop 
There is too much uncertainty associated 
with allowing social networking site 
members to interact with me in my virtual 
territory. 
TPRB9 .926 .039 .108 -.002 .009 -.046 
There is too much uncertainty associated 
with allowing social networking site 





To allow social networking site members to 
interact with me in my virtual territory 




To allow social networking site members to 
interact with others in my virtual territory 
involves many unexpected problems. 
TPRB 
12 





I trust that social networking site members 
would keep my best interests in mind when 
posting things in my virtual territory. 
TTB1 Drop 
Online social network members are in 
general predictable regarding posting things 
in my virtual territory. 
TTB2 -.013 .870 -.008 .118 .035 .019 
Online social network members are in 
general consistent regarding posting things 
in my virtual territory. 
TTB3 .002 .869 .128 .201 .007 -.036 




Table A6. Study 2: Items and Factor Loadings for TPRB, TTB, IPRB, ITB, and Technological Features 
Construct Questions Item# TPRB TTB IPRB ITB PD TF 
Social networking site members are, in 
general, honest with me about how they will 
behave when posting things in my virtual 
territory. 
TTB4 Drop 
I trust that social networking site members 
would keep my best interests in mind when 
interacting with others in my virtual 
territory. 
TTB5 Drop 
Online social network members are in 
general predictable regarding how they 
interact with others in my virtual territory. 
TTB6 .044 .881 .076 .176 .024 -.059 
Online social network members are in 
general consistent regarding how they 
interact with others in my virtual territory. 
TTB7 .071 .834 .192 .231 -.010 .053 
Social networking site members are in 
general honest with me about how they will 








It is risky to give my private information to 
online social network members. IPRB1 .015 .157 .832 -.016 -.006 -.073 
There is a high potential for loss associated 
with giving my private information to online 
social network members. 
IPRB2 .170 .119 .879 -.061 -.091 -.056 
There is too much uncertainty associated 
with giving my private information to online 
social network members. 
IPRB3 .209 .056 .859 -.056 -.109 -.011 
Sharing my private information in an online 
social network involves many unexpected 
problems. 





I trust that social networking site members 
would keep my best interests in mind when 
dealing with my private information. 
ITB1 Drop 
Social networking site members are in 
general honest with me regarding how they 
will discuss my private information. 
ITB2 -.003 .184 -.119 .866 .101 -.013 
Social networking site members are in 
general honest with me regarding how they 
will share my private information. 
ITB3 .046 .183 -.094 .900 .126 .013 
Social networking site members are in 
general predictable regarding how they will 
discuss my private information. 
ITB4 .019 .181 .011 .892 .067 -.032 
Social networking site members are in 
general predictable with me regarding how 
they will share my private information. 
ITB5 -.008 .172 -.025 .899 .071 -.064 
Social networking site members are in 
general consistent with me regarding how 
they will discuss my private information. 
ITB6 Drop 
Social networking site members are in 
general consistent with me regarding how 
they will share my private information. 
ITB7 Drop 




Table A6. Study 2: Items and Factor Loadings for TPRB, TTB, IPRB, ITB, and Technological Features 
Construct Questions Item# TPRB TTB IPRB ITB PD TF 
Private 
disclosure 
I would reveal personal thoughts about the 
photos in my virtual territory. PD1 -.099 .048 .094 .104 .866 -.054 
I would reveal personal feelings about the 
photos in my virtual territory. PD2 -.061 .023 .019 .092 .864 -.041 
I would reveal personal experiences about 
the photos in my virtual territory. PD3 Drop 
I would reveal sensitive information about 
the photos in my virtual territory. PD4 .142 -.048 -.205 .082 .767 .011 
I would reveal a lot of information about the 





There are sufficient tools/features for me to 
control who can access my virtual territory. TF1 -.154 -.068 -.061 -.027 -.004 .912 
There are sufficient tools/features for me to 
control which part of my virtual territory is 
accessible to various social networking site 
members. 
TF2 -.090 -.026 -.039 -.037 -.042 .941 
There are sufficient tools/features for me to 
control what social networking site members 
can do in my virtual territory. 
TF3 .028 .068 .000 -.021 -.018 .913 
 
Table A7. Study 2: Items for Control Variables 
Gender: male; female; other. 
Native language: Native language? Arabic; Chinese; English; French; Hindi; Korean; Malay; Portuguese; Spanish; Other, 
please specify _________. 
Education: Highest level of education attained? Some school, no degree; high school diploma; associates degree; bachelor’s 
degree; graduate degree. 
SNS type: Social networking site that you have visited/participated with the most in the past 30 days? Facebook; Instagram; 
Twitter; Forum; Blog; LinkedIn; Tumblr; Snapchat; other online social network, please specify _________. 
Tenure in SNS: Years you have participated in your focal online social network? Less than 1 year; 1-2 years; 2-3 years; 3-4 
years; 4-5 years; 5-6 years; 6-7 years; 7 or more.  
Connection number: Number of connections (e.g., friends, followers, etc.) in the focal online social network? Less than 100; 
101-200; 201-300; 301-400; 401-500; 501-600; 601-700; 701-800; 801-1,000; More than 1,000. 
Weekly hours in SNS: Hours per week, on average, in the focal online social network? < 1 hour per week; 1-2 hours per week; 
3-4 hours per week; 5-6 hours per week; 7-8 hours per week; 9-10 hours per week; 11-14 hours per week; 15-18 hours per 
week; 19-24 hours per week; 25-30 hours per week; 30-40 hours per week; > 40 hours per week.  
Technological features:  
(TF1) There are sufficient tools/features for me to control who can access my virtual territory. 
(TF2) There are sufficient tools/features for me to control which part of my virtual territory is accessible to various social 
networking site members. 








Appendix B: Item-Construct Correlation 



















IPC1 .931 .395 .375 -.004 .412 .410 .304 .315 .073 .301 -.164 .204 .201 .253 
IPC3 .948 .417 .385 .052 .447 .403 .279 .280 .044 .291 -.190 .195 .161 .231 
IPC4 .939 .434 .432 .026 .475 .364 .303 .305 .107 .280 -.149 .140 .163 .243 
IPC6 .416 .772 .340 .102 .358 .227 .505 .341 .185 .106 -.075 .152 .145 .250 
IPC7 .243 .824 .431 -.038 .365 .223 .491 .333 .181 .079 -.093 .228 .326 .299 
IPC8 .437 .882 .533 .022 .407 .228 .542 .308 .255 .030 -.143 .194 .235 .317 
IPC10 .352 .447 .935 .016 .432 .233 .422 .476 .156 .169 -.188 .252 .279 .256 
IPC11 .440 .532 .938 .036 .504 .255 .382 .512 .145 .158 -.219 .255 .278 .296 
IPC13 .374 .484 .961 .000 .470 .257 .446 .480 .169 .172 -.187 .223 .268 .255 
IPC14 .437 .543 .951 .002 .497 .277 .433 .530 .200 .133 -.220 .301 .329 .327 
ITB2 -.040 .040 -.011 .905 -.134 -.031 .210 .104 .340 .013 .207 -.003 -.026 -.059 
ITB3 .010 .042 .000 .936 -.111 -.003 .197 .118 .355 .061 .224 -.059 -.038 .020 
ITB4 .054 .022 .084 .904 -.025 .036 .198 .167 .364 .056 .162 -.032 .011 -.037 
ITB5 .080 .015 -.016 .913 -.054 .036 .176 .068 .353 .029 .176 -.104 -.043 -.045 
IPRB1 .412 .391 .432 -.039 .862 .264 .245 .219 .234 .173 -.080 .170 .180 .254 
IPRB2 .374 .419 .444 -.096 .925 .239 .231 .253 .205 .304 -.166 .221 .249 .177 
IPRB3 .485 .411 .474 -.106 .893 .354 .262 .333 .149 .327 -.176 .334 .208 .232 
IPRB4 .368 .291 .325 -.137 .772 .251 .168 .277 .111 .387 -.088 .254 .255 .117 
TPC1 .325 .163 .174 .041 .155 .862 .279 .266 .215 .484 -.061 .278 .110 .101 
TPC3 .345 .255 .261 -.027 .261 .913 .300 .321 .135 .433 -.188 .416 .179 .163 
TPC4 .434 .300 .277 .012 .428 .865 .300 .275 .180 .353 -.216 .316 .147 .111 
TPC6 .145 .352 .304 .074 .227 .309 .725 .349 .260 .144 -.038 .235 .139 .212 
TPC7 .227 .454 .250 .242 .128 .219 .819 .351 .244 .134 .021 .201 .317 .286 
TPC8 .359 .642 .490 .182 .295 .263 .814 .495 .253 .164 -.158 .139 .206 .387 
TPC11 .287 .369 .472 .072 .289 .346 .458 .918 .160 .319 -.208 .194 .222 .238 
TPC12 .264 .331 .469 .124 .257 .246 .450 .920 .185 .301 -.139 .218 .287 .225 
TPC14 .324 .378 .503 .146 .276 .302 .483 .896 .259 .252 -.255 .241 .238 .228 
TTB2 -.047 .142 .078 .301 .095 .068 .176 .124 .859 .001 .057 .100 .105 .051 
TTB3 .105 .270 .150 .354 .217 .225 .336 .242 .907 .073 .025 .065 .056 .063 
TTB6 .048 .153 .147 .345 .182 .141 .253 .163 .897 .091 .046 .072 .072 .137 
TTB7 .161 .316 .243 .366 .271 .260 .359 .246 .892 .143 .003 .080 .143 .153 
TPRB5 .291 .107 .188 .062 .332 .433 .183 .304 .099 .883 .002 .175 .194 .095 
TPRB6 .276 .072 .121 .044 .255 .458 .183 .299 .074 .946 -.007 .170 .177 .104 
TPRB9 .294 .057 .156 .015 .255 .445 .155 .285 .075 .948 .010 .151 .173 .114 
TPRB12 .233 .114 .145 -.029 .303 .358 .162 .272 .029 .774 -.006 .197 .202 .085 























PD1 -.042 -.024 -.028 .188 -.028 -.128 -.015 -.165 .088 -.039 .829 -.150 -.019 -.090 
PD2 -.041 .020 -.027 .179 -.082 -.129 .051 -.123 .053 -.022 .830 -.131 .006 .004 
PD3 -.030 -.002 -.098 .085 -.066 -.152 .037 -.124 .036 -.041 .699 -.196 -.058 -.025 
PD4 -.255 -.226 -.343 .160 -.215 -.121 -.134 -.211 -.029 .047 .849 -.147 -.059 -.283 
PD5 -.239 -.175 -.293 .185 -.193 -.212 -.138 -.233 .017 .014 .858 -.218 -.064 -.262 
TC2 .198 .196 .292 -.067 .237 .305 .209 .196 .067 .151 -.223 .897 .567 .481 
TC3 .086 .084 .073 -.040 .173 .277 .141 .142 .064 .173 -.007 .737 .473 .212 
TC4 .194 .294 .303 -.031 .279 .398 .259 .265 .095 .141 -.235 .927 .619 .486 
TC6 .108 .226 .291 -.072 .187 .090 .205 .229 .079 .001 -.117 .524 .785 .527 
TC9 .176 .263 .241 .014 .200 .159 .252 .229 .089 .267 .013 .564 .917 .429 
TC10 .201 .265 .279 -.019 .240 .183 .286 .263 .109 .228 -.018 .622 .933 .420 
TC14 .240 .264 .277 .030 .194 .140 .298 .245 .127 .061 -.175 .449 .421 .660 
TC15 .281 .380 .369 -.019 .257 .173 .431 .276 .149 .140 -.197 .461 .506 .933 
TC16 .254 .338 .265 -.044 .217 .135 .335 .247 .084 .084 -.201 .450 .478 .967 
TC17 .202 .283 .224 -.030 .229 .100 .317 .200 .096 .100 -.160 .438 .490 .956 
 
 




Appendix C: Mediation Test 
Table C1 presents the results of the effect size test, the Sobel test, the mediation types, and the VAF of mediation 
effects for the post hoc analysis. The Sobel test is a z-statistic based on the path coefficients and the standard errors of 
two paths: the path from the independent variable to the mediator and the path from the mediator to the dependent 
variable (Sobel, 1982). The F statistic is calculated as ƒ2 × (n-k-1), with (1, (n-k)) degrees of freedom, where n = 
sample size, k = number of constructs, and ƒ2 = (R2 for path included - R2 for path excluded) / (1 - R2 for path included) 
(Chin, Marcolin, & Newsted, 2003). VAF is computed as (indirect path coefficient α × indirect path coefficient β) / 
(indirect path coefficient α × indirect path coefficient β + direct path efficient) (Helm, Eggert, & Garnefeld, 2010). 
Table C1. Summary of Mediation Tests 
 Path 
Path coefficient Effect size Sobel Mediation 
type 
VAF 
β P value ƒ2 F P value Z P value 
IPC-ITB-PD 
IPC-ITB 0.025 NS 
0.037 5.883 p < 0.05 
0.267 NS No Mediation 0.009 ITB-PD 0.196 p < 0.01 
IPC-PD -0.269 p < 0.01 0.057 9.063 p < 0.01 
IPC-IPRB-PD 
IPC-IPRB 0.558 p < 0.001 
0.000 0.000 NS 
0.238 NS No Mediation 0.046 IPRB-PD 0.023 NS 
IPC-PD -0.269 p < 0.01 0.057 9.063 NS 
IPC-IPRB-TC 
IPC-IPRB 0.558 p < 0.001 
0.008 1.272 NS 
1.038 NS No Mediation 0.160 IPRB-TC 0.102 NS 
IPRB-TC 0.298 p < 0.001 0.070 11.130 p < 0.001 
IPC-ITB-IPRB 
IPC-ITB 0.025 NS 
0.023 3.657 NS 
0.276 NS No Mediation 0.005 ITB-IPRB -0.120 NS 
IPC-IPRB 0.558 p < 0.001 0.483 76.797 p < 0.001 
ITB-IPRB-PD 
ITB-IPRB -0.120 NS 
0.012 1.908 NS 
0.946 NS No Mediation 0.067 IPRB-PD -0.105 NS 
ITB-PD 0.175 p < 0.05 0.033 5.247 p < 0.05 
ITB-IPRB-TC 
ITB-IPRB -0.120 NS 
0.057 9.063 p < 0.01 
1.351 NS No Mediation 0.301 IPRB-TC 0.245 p < 0.01 
ITB-TC -0.068 NS 0.004 0.636 NS 
IPRB-TC-PD 
IPRB-TC 0.260 p < 0.01 
0.009 1.431 NS 
0.776 NS No Mediation 0.182 TC-PD -0.090 NS 
IPRB-PD -0.105 NS 0.012 1.908 NS 
TPC-TTB-TC 
TPC-TTB 0.334 p < 0.001 
0.001 0.159 NS 
0.033 NS No Mediation 0.002 TTB-TC -0.002 NS 
TPC-TC 0.321 p < 0.001 0.097 15.423 p < 0.001 
TPC-TPRB-
TC 
TPC-TPRB 0.451 p < 0.001 
0.000 0.000 NS 
0.459 NS No Mediation 0.046 TPRB-TC 0.034 NS 
TPC-TC 0.321 p < 0.001 0.097 15.423 p < 0.001 
TPC-TTB-
TPRB 
TPC-TTB 0.333 p < 0.001 
0.002 0.318 NS 
0.636 NS No Mediation 0.035 TTB-TPRB -0.049 NS 
TPC-TPRB 0.452 p < 0.001 0.224 35.616 p < 0.001 




Table C1. Summary of Mediation Tests 
TPC-TPRB-
IPRB 
TPC-TPRB 0.452 p < 0.001 
0.052 8.268 p < 0.01 
2.477 p < 0.05 Full Mediation 0.645 TPRB-IPRB 0.197 p < 0.01 
TPC-IPRB -0.049 NS 0.002 0.318 NS 
TTB-TPRB-
TC 
TTB-TPRB -0.049 NS 
0.020 3.180 NS 
0.594 NS No Mediation 0.090 TPRB-TC 0.141 NS 
TTB-TC 0.070 NS 0.005 0.795 NS 
TTB-TPRB-
IPRB 
TTB-TPRB -0.048 NS 
0.050 7.95 p < 0.01 
0.639 NS No Mediation 0.048 TPRB-IPRB 0.176 p < 0.05 
TTB-IPRB 0.167 p < 0.05 0.038 6.042 p < 0.05 
TPRB-IPRB-
PD 
TPRB-IPRB 0.183 p < 0.01 
0.016 2.544 NS 
1.287 NS No Mediation 0.237 IPRB-PD -0.127 NS 
TPRB-PD 0.075 NS 0.006 0.954 NS 
TPRB-IPRB-
TC 
TPRB-IPRB 0.183 p < 0.01 
0.069 10.971 p < 0.001 
1.997 p < 0.05 Full Mediation 0.252 IPRB-TC 0.260 p < 0.01 
TPRB-TC 0.141 NS 0.020 3.180 NS 
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